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ABSTRACT 
 Throughout Al-Shabaab’s history, the militant group has demonstrated enduring 
organizational resiliency in the face of concerted international counterterrorism efforts and 
turbulent internal dynamics. This thesis explores the factors that enabled the terrorist 
group’s success and resilience in East Africa by considering two severe low points in the 
group’s history, notably the failure of the Ramadan Offensive in 2010 and the death of Al-
Shabaab emir Ahmed Godane in 2014. Both cases apply alternative hypotheses related to 
political context, organizational attributes, and counterterrorism failures and assess the 
hypotheses’ relevance to the case of Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s critical factors 
for resiliency provide insight into potential policy implications for Somalia and similarly 
situated conflict zones. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
See Figure 1 for a 2011 map of Somalia. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Somalia1 
 
1 “Somalia Map,” United Nations Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, December 2011, 
https://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/somalia.pdf. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since its inception, Al-Shabaab has shown its ability to adapt and respond as a 
strategic, pragmatic actor in the face of significant international efforts to eradicate the 
terrorist organization. Despite its claim of Salafi-jihadist principles and enforcement of 
sharia law in areas of territorial control, the group has resorted to extortion, smuggling, 
illicit trafficking, and ties with criminal elements that run counter to its religious principles. 
Why has Al-Shabaab endured in East Africa despite significant external pressure and major 
inconsistencies between its ideological claims and practices? This thesis explores theories 
of militant group resiliency and assesses their relevance to the case of Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia. After investigating alternative hypotheses, this thesis finds that Al-Shabaab 
survives and thrives through a multifaceted approach incorporating factors including 
internal organizational attributes, political context, and strategic failures in the war on 
terrorism. Al-Shabaab’s organizational cohesion, financial mechanisms, and intelligence 
function allow the group to fill the void of the Somali state and rebound from near 
destruction. With Al-Shabaab’s critical resiliency factors highlighted, the thesis concludes 
with policy implications for countering enduring threats in Somalia and similarly situated 
conflict zones. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
For the United States, Al-Shabaab has remained a persistent challenge since 2007 
and the United States has sought to combat the terrorist organization through both bilateral 
and multilateral means.2 On the bilateral side, the United States supports the government 
of Somalia’s security forces in their counterterrorism efforts, while multilaterally, the 
United States supports the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) through 
finances, training, and equipment.3 In April of 2017, President Trump authorized the 
deployment of 500 United States military service members to Somalia and ramped up 
kinetic operations against Al-Shabaab from 14 airstrikes conducted in 2016 to 35 
 
2 Claire Felter, Jonathan Masters, and Mohammed Sergie, “Al-Shabab Backgrounder,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, January 31, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shabab. 
3 Felter, Masters, and Sergie. 
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conducted in 2017.4 In addition to military operations, the United States has placed 
significant pressure on Al-Shabaab’s operational, financial, and political efforts. Yet, Al-
Shabaab’s organizational strengths remain and continue to allow the movement to 
destabilize East Africa.5 Understanding Al-Shabaab’s Islamist ideological origins, 
evolution, and appeal in East Africa as well as its organizational strategies and conduct can 
help explain why the group remains successful and provide policy implications for 
countering enduring threats in the region. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
A review of the literature regarding terrorist group resilience reveals a number of 
potential explanations for how groups operate and therefore why groups are able to endure. 
These explanations can be categorized into the terrorist group’s organizational attributes, 
the political context in which the group operates, and the strategic failures of external actors 
who seek the group’s demise. The organizational attribute explanation investigates the 
characteristics that allow militant groups to overcome adversity and is comprised of two 
sub-approaches: an internal organizational and organizational resilience approach.6 
Another approach explores how the political context allows militant groups to revitalize 
their organizations after major setbacks. A third approach looks at the failings of 
counterterrorism strategies. Each of these approaches generates testable hypotheses for the 
study of Al-Shabaab resilience in Somalia.  
1. Organizational Attribute Approach: Internal Organization and 
Organizational Resilience 
In this approach, Oots classifies terrorist groups as political entities and thus 
organizational considerations such as overall internal cohesion, group size, leadership 
 
4 Felter, Masters, and Sergie. 
5 Thomas Waldhauser, “United States Africa Command Posture Statement,” § Senate Armed Services 
Committee (2019), 4. 
6 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” Journal of 
Strategic Studies 10, no. 4 (December 1, 1987): 13–31, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437313.; René 
M. Bakker, Jörg Raab, and H. Brinton Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis & Management 31, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 34, https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.20619. 
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structure, and the nature of external support and linkages all play a role in group resilience.7 
Crenshaw elaborates on this notion of organizational attributes as she claims a terrorist 
group’s struggle for survival shapes the internal actions within a group.8 Winning 
member’s unquestioning loyalty and preventing dissent and defection within the 
organization is essential for the group’s continued existence. How successfully terrorist 
leaders provide incentives to their members to maintain loyalty and group cohesion 
determines the likelihood of group survivability in the face of external pressure.9 Finally, 
Cronin identifies the internal structure of the terrorist organization, from hierarchical to 
decentralized, and the viability of a successor determines whether a group will survive.10 
Delineating terrorist groups’ internal organizational attributes can help explain why certain 
groups survive, such as Al-Shabaab, and others fracture under pressure.  
A final explanation of terrorism using the Organizational Attributes Approach is 
the organizational resilience model. In this approach, Bakker, Raab, and Milward focus on 
the internal decision making process of dark networks, such as terrorist organizations, 
when faced with a “shock” such as an attack or any other unforeseen negative event.11 The 
authors determine the likelihood of dark network resilience (listed in Figure 2) using the 
following variables: group centralization, member motivation, network characteristics 
including “legitimacy and resources,” and network capability meaning “the ability to 
replace nodes and linkages” of key members within the network.12 In Bakker, Raab, and 
Milward’s model, networks that are able to remain stable, i.e., “robust” or to reestablish 
stability, i.e., “rebound” are deemed resilient networks while those that fail to overcome 
the impact of “shock” are deemed non-resilient networks.13 In this way, terrorist 
 
7 Kent L. Oots, “Bargaining with Terrorists: Organizational Considerations,” Terrorism 13, no. 2 
(January 1, 1990): 156, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576109008435821. 
8 Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism,” 13, 27. 
9 Crenshaw, 13, 27. 
10 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Campaigns (Princeton University Press, 2009), 14. 
11 Bakker, Raab, and Milward, “A Preliminary Theory of Dark Network Resilience,” 35. 
12 Bakker, Raab, and Milward, 58–59. 
13 Bakker, Raab, and Milward, 35. 
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organizations can be seen to exhibit a degree of organizational learning in that they rebound 
from crises equal to or stronger than they were before facing the shock. 
 
Figure 2. Operationalization of dark network resilience14 
When applied to the context of Somalia, the organizational attribute approach 
incorporates both Al-Shabaab’s internal organizational factors which allow the group to 
function, and the organizational resilience factors which allow Al-Shabaab to respond to 
“shock” or external pressure. Hypothesis 1 therefore considers that specific organizational 
attributes allow Al-Shabaab to remain resilient in the face of a dynamic political 
environment and significant international pressure. By analyzing specific challenges that 
Al-Shabaab has faced in its past, it will be possible to identify internal organizational or 
resiliency factors that allow the group to remain successful. 
2. Political Context Approach 
Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer define terror organizations that have conducted 
multiple attacks, or “recidivists,” and determine that “regional, socioeconomic, and 
political factors” impact the organization’s survival and lethality.15 They conclude that for 
 
14 Bakker, Raab, and Milward, 36. 
15 S. Brock Blomberg, Rozlyn C. Engel, and Reid Sawyer, “On the Duration and Sustainability of 
Transnational Terrorist Organizations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 54, no. 2 (April 2010): 327, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002709355431. 
6 
these types of terrorist organizations, improvements in the target country’s socioeconomic 
status such as GDP per capita and higher income dispersion in populated areas means the 
group will be less likely to survive.16 Young and Dugan further explain how the nature of 
the government system in which the terrorist group operates alters the group’s likelihood 
of survival.17 Within their study, the authors found that increases in state capability, 
including GDP, population, and Composite Index of National Capability, significantly 
increase terrorist organizations’ risk of failure as the state has greater capacity both 
financially and militarily to combat the threat.18 Thus, for these authors the political 
context in which terrorist groups operate shapes the strategy the group employs and the 
overall resilience of the group. 
Applying the Political Context approach to Al-Shabaab, the failed state dynamic 
provides an opportunity to test Hypothesis 2, Somalia’s political context provides Al-
Shabaab the needed space and leverage to allow the group to remain resilient when 
challenged with both domestic and international opposition. As Al-Shabaab faces limited 
viable rivals and a political vacuum in areas outside Somalia’s central government control, 
the group is able to successfully exploit the political environment to establish quasi-state 
functions through nominal buy-in and coercion. 
3. Failed Counterterrorism Approach 
The final perspective on terrorist group resilience takes into account the strategic 
failures of external actors to eliminate the group. Cronin argues that terrorist movements 
end by following distinct paths namely, negotiations, decapitation, internal failures, 
diminished public support, external repression, or transition to alternative violent action.19 
Similarly, Jones and Libicki offer an assessment that terrorist groups end by achieving their 
goals in full or in part, by losing popular support, transitioning to another goal, burning 
 
16 Brock Blomberg, Engel, and Sawyer, 318. 
17 Joseph K. Young and Laura Dugan, “Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure,” 
Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 2 (April 24, 2014): 16, http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/
pot/article/view/334. 
18 Young and Dugan, 15. 
19 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends. 
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out, or by the state destroying the group through repression or elimination of the leader.20 
In both Cronin and Jones and Libicki’s arguments, the failure of external actors to 
understand the factors that weaken and kill terrorist movements and to misapply the 
appropriate strategy for the terrorist group type allows groups and movements to endure.21 
Specifically for the decapitation strategy, Mannes emphasizes that eliminating a terrorist 
group’s leader fails to achieve the intended effect of reducing terrorist activity and group 
strength especially for religious-based terrorist organizations.22 Cronin, Jones and Libicki, 
and Mannes all emphasize the need to understand terrorist group type, strength, size, and 
goals in order to apply an effective counterterrorism strategy or risk fostering terrorist 
group’s persistence.23 
For Al-Shabaab, the Failed Counterterrorism Approach may explain the group’s 
resilience despite coalition efforts to eliminate the group. Hypothesis 3 states that Al-
Shabaab has remained successful and resilient as a terrorist organization due to failures in 
United States’ and international counterterrorist strategies. By reviewing current and 
historical counterterrorism tactics and strategy employed against Al-Shabaab as well as Al-
Shabaab’s response, it is possible to identify instances of misapplied efforts as external 
forces conduct successful kinetic operations while failing to address root causes thereby 
allowing the terrorist organization to remain resilient. 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to determine why Al-Shabaab is able to persist and succeed in East Africa, 
this thesis opens with a review of the terrorist organization’s history and ideological roots, 
then proceeds to discuss specific periods when the organization faced crisis, risked failing, 
 
20 Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qa’ida 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008). 
21 Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.; Jones and Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End. 
22 Aaron Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a 
Terrorist Group’s Activity?,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2008, 40, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2988670. 
23 Mannes, “Testing the Snake Head Strategy.”; Cronin, How Terrorism Ends.; Jones and Libicki, 
How Terrorist Groups End. 
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yet was able to persevere.24 A number of sources will be referenced in order to accomplish 
this analysis including numerous news reports and the works by Keating and Waldman 
War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local Conflict and Al-Shabaab, Hansen 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005–
2012, and Maruf and Joseph Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda’s Most 
Powerful Ally to provide historical context and insight into the two case studies. In addition, 
this thesis incorporates a number of reports from The International Crisis Group, UN, 
World Bank, RAND, as well as academic articles analyzing Al-Shabaab’s mode of 
operation and impact on East Africa.25 Two specific periods in Al-Shabaab’s history 
highlight instances when the organization came under pressure: Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal 
post-Ramadan offensive in 2010 and Al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane’s death in 
2014.26 During both of these setbacks, Al-Shabaab suffered significant leadership 
challenges, faced internal discord, and lost control of territory, but proved its ability to 
adapt militarily and politically.27 By evaluating these two case studies, it will be possible 
to isolate critical variables in Al-Shabaab’s resiliency to determine what allows the groups 
to remain successful.  
Next, the competing hypotheses of Hypothesis 1: The Organizational Attributes 
Approach, Hypothesis 2: The Political Context Approach, and Hypothesis 3: The 
Failed Counterterrorism Approach will each be applied to the case studies to determine 
the accuracy in explaining Al-Shabaab’s resiliency. For each hypothesis, a review of the 
 
24 Michael Keating and Matt Waldman, eds., War and Peace in Somalia: National Grievances, Local 
Conflict and Al-Shabaab (Oxford University Press, 2019). 
25 Utz Pape and Wendy Karamba, “Somalia Poverty and Vulnerability Assessment: Findings from 
Wave 2 of the Somali High Frequency Survey” (Washington, DC: World Bank Group, April 2019), 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/32323.; Stephen Watts et al., Reforming Security 
Sector Assistance for Africa, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/
research_briefs/RB10028.html; Katharine Petrich, “Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal 
Activities in the Horn of Africa,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (October 17, 2019): 1–22, https://doi.org/
10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873. 
26 Harun Maruf and Dan Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab: The Secret History of Al-Qaeda’s Most Powerful 
Ally (Indiana University Press, 2018), 162–76, 236, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv6mtfn2. 
27 International Crisis Group, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War,” Policy Briefing, no. 99 
(June 26, 2014): 1, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/somalia-al-shabaab-it-will-be-
long-war. 
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major themes and causal arguments will provide a framework of analysis for the specific 
case studies within the Somali context and reveal a potential explanation for Al-Shabaab’s 
organizational resilience. To determine whether each hypothesis is supported or not, this 
thesis evaluates specific criteria in two case studies.  
For Hypothesis 1: The Organizational Attributes approach to be valid, evidence 
should include Al-Shabaab’s successful organizational cohesion namely unity among the 
group’s leadership and an effective succession process. Additional organizational attributes 
include Al-Shabaab’s power mechanisms such as an efficient organizational financial 
system and a loyal and effective intelligence apparatus, both of which allow the group to 
exert control and rebound from shock. Successful financial functions mean that Al-
Shabaab’s operations match the income obtained, the sustainability of Al-Shabaab’s 
income sources, and the adaptability of the group to diversify or adjust financial 
mechanisms as needed. Evidence of an effective intelligence apparatus includes Al-
Shabaab’s intelligence operatives successfully identifying individuals or nodes to target for 
coercion or recruitment, the intelligence force providing timely and accurate information 
for Al-Shabaab’s leadership decisions, and the intelligence personnel reliably enforcing 
Al-Shabaab’s leadership decrees. Evidence of Al-Shabaab’s effective organizational 
cohesion and power mechanisms of finance and intelligence within each case study 
suggests that Hypothesis 1: The Organizational Attribute approach is at work.  
Support for Hypothesis 2: The Political Context approach should include 
evidence of Somalia’s failed state environment as well as Kenya’s proximity and viability 
as an attractive target for attack. The absence of effective state institutions in Somalia mean 
the government fails to provide Somalia’s citizens with basic needs and services such as 
rule of law, security, healthcare, and education. Evidence supporting Hypothesis 2: The 
Political Context should include indications of Al-Shabaab filling the void in the Somalian 
state’s failure thereby increasing the group’s reach and power. This would include Al-
Shabaab exploiting environmental factors such as drought and inter-clan rivalries in order 
to exacerbate the crisis and expand the group’s influence. In addition, neighboring Kenya 
offers Al-Shabaab the opportunity for high profile attacks and potential recruitment base 
among Somali diaspora. Both case studies will be examined for further evidence of Al-
10 
Shabaab exploiting the regional political context of Somalia’s failed state and Kenya’s 
proximity in order to remain successful and resilient as an organization.  
Hypothesis 3: The Failed Counterterrorism approach will take an alternative 
angle on Al-Shabaab’s resiliency namely, considering the failure of legitimate states and 
alliances to effectively confront the organization. For both case studies, counterterrorism 
policies will be analyzed at three levels: the Somali government, both the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) and Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), AMISOM, and 
the United States. For this hypothesis to be supported, counterterrorism policies will be 
evaluated for evidence of policies backfiring, creating additional grievances among local 
Somali populous, and bolstering Al-Shabaab’s operations. With this knowledge, it will be 
possible to note the accuracy of this hypothesis and discuss policy implications for the 
United States and coalition partners and construct tailored counterterrorism solutions. 
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis focuses on Al-Shabaab’s evolution since 2006, punctuated by two 
specific low points in the group’s history—the regression in 2010 and the loss of their emir 
in 2014— to determine how the group responded in each circumstance. The subsequent 
chapters will describe the factors that have enabled the group to remain resilient including 
ideological exploitation, local cultural understanding, and the group’s ability to be 
adaptable to austere conditions to maintain both their financial resilience and intelligence 
apparatus. It will examine how Al-Shabaab’s understanding of the regional political, 
historical, and cultural environment within their sphere of influence, from the local 
environment within Somalia and beyond to regionally across East Africa, enable the 
organization to exploit conditions to their favor.  
11 
II. EVOLUTION OF AL-SHABAAB 
Al-Shabaab’s Islamist ideological origins, evolution, and appeal underpins the 
group’s success throughout East Africa. This section will first discuss the historical origins 
of Al-Shabaab including the group’s link to al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI, or “Unity of Islam”), 
the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), and Al-Qaeda. It will then characterize Al-Shabaab’s 
ideological narrative and identify how Al-Shabaab uses this narrative to exploit the 
religious and cultural context within Somalia and among its diaspora throughout the region, 
namely Kenya. Finally, this section will summarize Al-Shabaab’s major power 
mechanisms including both its financial and intelligence apparatuses that enable the 
organization’s internal functions, leverage external support for the group, and coerce local 
populations to follow Al-Shabaab’s bidding.  
A. HISTORY 
Al-Shabaab’s historical origins took root in anarchic and impoverished Somalia, 
starting first with the formation of AIAI, the ICU, and eventually formalizing as Al-
Shabaab. Somalia’s descent into anarchy followed the 1991 collapse of the Siad Barre 
regime and resulted in persistent inter-clan and warlord conflict.28 The lack of decisive 
victory by any single faction meant widespread instability and enduring insecurity 
throughout the country.29 By the late 1990s, local Islamic clerics attempted to exert a 
degree of order and stability through the establishment of neighborhood sharia courts.30  
The ICU became the most influential of such sharia court networks, as the loose 
coalition of Islamic clerics and militia members promised to end to the chaotic warlord 
rule.31 Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann describe the ICU’s exploitation of the instability 
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to forward their jihadist vision among a primarily moderate population: “While the group’s 
aim to bring banditry under control was popular with the local populations, it is arguable 
that its desire to impose sharia law was not. Their strict interpretation of Islam had little in 
common with the local traditional Sufi practices of most Somalis, yet the population was 
willing to tolerate ICU’s zeal in exchange for some long-desired security.”32 With the 
necessary backing of popular support, the ICU managed to gain control of a large portion 
of Somalia and paved the way for more extremist factions to move in and eventually take 
over. 
The Islamic militant group AIAI proved to be just such an extremist faction. 
Between 1982 and 1984, Middle Eastern-educated Somali Wahhabis founded AIAI as a 
Salafist organization with the goal of overthrowing Mohammed Said Barre’s regime.33 
Through AIAI’s Middle Eastern connection, its core membership received funding and 
arms from Osama bin Laden.34 Over the decades, however, the group failed to achieve its 
objective of establishing a Salafist state as it lacked cohesive structure and leadership and 
suffered internal infighting.35 By 2000, the remaining membership consisted primarily of 
young, militant radicals.36 This group of young fundamentalists known as Al-Shabaab, or 
“the youth,” decided to form an alliance with the ICU as the organization’s youth militia.37  
Together, Al-Shabaab and the ICU took control of Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, 
in June 2006, a provocation that incited neighboring Ethiopia to stage an intervention for 
fear of spillover violence.38 This invasion by Ethiopia, a historical enemy of Somalia, 
significantly aided Al-Shabaab’s plight as it proved to be a call to action from both an 
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Islamist and Somali nationalist perspective.39 Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann describe 
the resulting environment for the expansion of Al-Shabaab: “The more moderate sections 
of the ICU, composed mostly of Sufis, were eclipsed in influence by the more radical wings 
in the wake of the Ethiopian invasion. Conflating their global Islamist outlook with 
nationalist emotions brewing after the invasion, former AIAI leaders such as Aweys and 
Ayrow led a well-trained and deeply ideological militia of young volunteers that began 
engaging in daring actions against Ethiopian troops.”40 The Ethiopian invasion allowed 
Al-Shabaab to win additional fighters, consolidate disparate militant group factions, and 
gain sympathizers among local populations.41 
As the fight devolved into a full-fledged insurgency, Al-Shabaab adjusted tactics. 
In April 2007, Al-Shabaab’s insurgency strategy included recruitment for suicide bombing 
operations, which they euphemistically called “martyrdom operations,” a tactic not 
previously seen within Somalia’s conflict.42 Mwagi describes the evolution of the tactics 
and goals Al-Shabaab displayed: “Al-Shabaab has significantly transformed the nature of 
the conflict in Somalia by introducing, into this conflict, extremism. The conflict has now 
acquired a more global jihadist dimension. Attacks carried out by the movement have 
demonstrated its ability to strike outside its usual territory, adding fears that the group is 
becoming more transnational.”43 Even as Ethiopian troops pulled out of Somalia in early 
2009, Al-Shabaab’s tactical flexibility proved vital for the organizational survival and 
further linked Al-Shabaab with Al-Qaeda’s jihadist approach.44 
Al-Shabaab’s link with Al-Qaeda formalized over the next few years. Although 
AIAI had retained several Al-Qaeda linked individuals as early as the late-1990s, Al-Qaeda 
remained focused on global issues while AIAI primarily remained committed to 
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establishing an Islamic state within Greater Somalia.45 However with Al-Shabaab’s rising 
prominence, the two organizations became more closely aligned. Just as Ethiopia’s 
invasion of Somalia had mobilized the Somali population to support Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda 
supporters again saw an opportunity to confront the “foreign crusaders” within Somalia.46 
According to Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann, “In March 2009, Osama bin Laden issued 
a video titled ‘Fight On, Champions of Somalia’ in which he specifically endorsed Al-
Shabaab. In an As-Sahab video recording titled ‘No Peace Without Islam,’ Al-Qaeda 
commander Abu Yahya al-Libi similarly called on Muslims around the world to stand with 
Al-Shabaab.”47 Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda endorsement video served as the vital 
publicity and recognition Al-Shabaab needed to fuel its insurgency. 
Throughout 2010, Al-Qaeda provided additional support to Al-Shabaab when it 
sent hundreds of Afghanistan-trained foreign fighters to southern Somalia to facilitate Al-
Shabaab training camps.48 With the continued flow of foreign fighters joining Al-Shabaab, 
Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann note Al-Shabaab’s growing ambitions: “Considering this 
change in political landscape and increased use of religious, global, and Al-Qaeda-inspired 
imagery over nationalistic themes in Al-Shabaab’s rhetoric since the Ethiopians’ pullout, 
it is fair to state that it is likely that some of the volunteers that joined the group since 2008 
are more attracted by its global jihadist ideology than by patriotic fervor.”49 Al-Shabaab 
found that its association with Al-Qaeda fed the notion that local struggles served a greater 
purpose: the global jihad of Islam versus infidelity.50  
In 2012, Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda leadership agreed to a formal merger of the two 
organizations with Al-Shabaab deemed an official affiliate and Al-Shabaab’s leader 
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Godane named as Al-Qaeda’s emir for Somalia.51 In addition, Al-Shabaab remained 
closely linked with another Al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), by continuing to exchange intelligence, equipment, and expertise among their 
fighters.52 These alliances provided Al-Shabaab necessary practical support but also 
allowed Al-Shabaab to continue framing Somalia’s conflict in terms of a global struggle 
against apostate governments, notably the group’s “near enemies” of Ethiopia and the 
Somalia’s government.53 In contrast, Al-Shabaab’s link with Al-Qaeda allowed them to 
also consider the United States and Europe as “far enemies” of Islam.54  
Later, as Al-Qaeda’s rival ISIS gained prominence, Al-Shabaab briefly considered 
allying with the organization, but due to Al-Shabaab’s connections with Al-Qaeda’s 
leadership, Al-Shabaab rejected ISIS’s advances.55 According to Maruf and Joseph, 
“Essentially, Al-Shabaab wanted to remain important in the global jihad arena, and Al-
Qaeda gave them brand approval, despite Al-Shabaab having no real ties to Al-Qaeda core 
aside from general guidance and advice.”56 The mutually beneficial alliance between Al-
Qaeda and Al-Shabaab has enabled the group to conduct complex attacks throughout the 
region, significantly subvert efforts to establish stable governance in Somalia, and present 
an ongoing threat to the Horn of Africa.57 
B. IDEOLOGY 
Much like the historical origins of Al-Shabaab, the ideology of the group evolved 
in response to challenges and shifting goals. As previously noted, Al-Shabaab’s history 
advanced from specific, nationalistic interests to global jihad, a concept known as 
sacralization. According to Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlmann, “Sacralization of conflict is 
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the process through which religion, or, in most cases, a militant interpretation of it, evolves 
from being an irrelevant or secondary factor at the onset of a conflict to shaping the views, 
actions, and aims of one or more of the conflict’s key actors.”58 In Al-Shabaab’s case, the 
ideological shift from removing an Ethiopian occupation to eradicating the Somali 
government and establishing a global Islamic caliphate makes a peaceful solution nearly 
impossible as Al-Shabaab’s religious imperatives allow no space for negotiation or 
compromise.59 
Al-Shabaab’s extremist views of Islam follows a Salafi-Jihadist ideology. 
According to Maher, Salafi-Jihadism remains a broad and complex belief system: “This 
millenarian project believes in progress through regression, where the perfect life is 
realized by reviving the Islam of its first three generations. Taken as markers for both 
authenticity and purity, the legacy of these so-called ‘pious predecessors’ … provides the 
praxis for action in contemporary Salafism.”60 As Al-Shabaab seeks to establish a purist 
Islamic society emulating these “pious predecessors,” the movement imposes a strict code 
of conduct that prohibits movies, sports, khat, and immodest dress.61 Al-Shabaab portrays 
itself as the protector of true Islam and believes its version of Islam will lead to stability 
and good governance in the region.62 
While Al-Shabaab strives for legitimacy as an empowered Islamist organization 
capable of governing Somali society, their identity as a Salafi-Jihadist organization remains 
ambiguous. The concept of Salafi-Jihadism is diverse in practice as many Salafi-Jihadist 
groups hold divergent opinions and follow various interpretations of Islam.63 As Maher 
defines it, “Movements within Salafism differ sharply over their views on the modern 
nation-state, its role, and legitimacy. They consequently prescribe different methods… for 
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change, from inert quietism to revolutionary upheaval.”64 For Al-Shabaab, this interpretive 
pluralism allows the organization to justify its violent jihad and combat any opposition in 
terms of religious blasphemy.65  
Within the context of Somalia, Al-Shabaab faces the ideological challenge of 
reforming or eliminating the dominant role of Sufism throughout society.66 Classified as a 
deviant Islamic sect by Al-Shabaab, Sufism “is particularly disliked because of ‘saint 
worship’ and other ‘idolatrous’ (shirk) acts,” according to Mwangi.67 The author 
continues: “Al-Shabaab controls religious institutions and associated religious symbols 
that run contrary to its variant of Islamism through practices such as destroying or 
desecrating shrines and graves.”68 Since 2008, Al-Shabaab has executed numerous Sufi 
Muslim clerics and any known supporters.69 Al-Shabaab views Sufism as incompatible 
with authentic Islamic society and strives for its eradication from local politics and 
Somalia’s tribal environment.70 
Al-Shabaab pursues its ultraconservative interpretation of sharia through a strategy 
of religious socialization, rehabilitation of Somali society, and pacification of inter-clan 
violence.71 Al-Shabaab begins with the premise that its extreme version of Islam is correct 
and incontestable while all other interpretations are false, obliterating the possibility of any 
further debate about Islamic jurisprudence or sharia.72 As such, the group liberally 
proclaims takfir, or excommunication, upon individuals alleged to have committed serious 
sins against Islam, even in cases of faithful Muslim adherents committing minor 
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offenses.73 This notion allows the group to confront elders and religious leaders and attract 
younger followers, as Mwangi describes it: “The Islamism professed by the movement also 
offers the youth a route to globalization and a means to practice their faith in any situation. 
It allows its faithful to detach themselves from their local situations and seek out a less 
parochial environment. Al-Shabaab has gained some social control and legitimacy through 
its religious rhetoric and practices.”74 
Al-Shabaab’s link with Al-Qaeda offers further ideological appeal through the 
endorsement of the Al-Qaeda “brand.” 75 Al-Qaeda offers Al-Shabaab a broadened 
ideological mindset of a shared critique of the current world order and the nation-state 
system, a legendary status symbol, and a basic framework for which other extremist 
organizations can be franchised.76 For Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda’s global jihadist movement 
enables their primarily nationalistic agenda to be transformed rhetorically and 
operationally into a global struggle for Islam.77 According to Vidino, Pantucci, and 
Kohlmann, this transformation serves both organizations as “local actors might maintain 
some of their parochial agendas, but by putting themselves under the banner of the global 
jihadist movement they benefit from outside support in terms of funding, recruits, 
propaganda, and military expertise. The global jihadist movement also benefits, as it can 
expand its influence and add credibility to its narrative that Islam is under attack from non-
Muslims.”78 
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C. AL-SHABAAB’S EXPLOITATION OF THE REGIONAL CULTURAL 
CONTEXT 
1. Somalia’s Clan Dynamic and Cultural Context 
In addition to Al-Shabaab’s ideological appeal and religious narrative, Al-Shabaab 
also seeks to exploit the cultural context within Somalia, including pervasive clannism and 
failed state environment. As previously discussed, Somalia’s clan environment provides 
the basis for the way of life in Somalia, yet the clan system remains fluid and complex.79 
Organized by lineage, Somali society remains closely tied to ancestry, and alliances often 
follow the proximity of one’s lineage with another.80 Shapiro describes the nature of 
clannism in Somalia, “Clannism forms the foundation for most of traditional Somali core 
social institutions and norms such as personal identity, local resource rights, customary law 
(xeer), blood payment (diya) groups, and social support systems.”81 Despite the shared 
ethnicity, language, and culture throughout Somalia, clan identity and loyalty hold 
immense importance and influence over society.82  
While clannism remains fundamental to Somali society, Islam provides a horizontal 
identity that can unify clan lines and complement traditional societal hierarchy.83 Rather 
than challenging clan identity, Shapiro explains, “Shari’a law has historically never been a 
primary source of law, although aspects of Shari’a have been assimilated within xeer. 
Though Islamism in contemporary Somalia has soared, clannism remains the dominant 
political logic, within which Islamists and Shari’a courts are generally constrained.”84 
Although in many ways Islam remains subordinated within the context of Somali clannism, 
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when the clans face a common enemy, especially a foreign, non-Muslim threat, Islam can 
become a tool of unification and mass mobilization.85 
Al-Shabaab recognizes the challenges and opportunities that Somalia’s clan system 
offers. As an organization, Al-Shabaab uses its Salafi-Jihadist ideology to discredit local 
social structures, build alliances among competing clans, and establish sharia as the source 
of law to gain legitimacy.86 Hansen notes Al-Shabaab’s success in this endeavor, “Various 
clans will try to ally with Al-Shabaab as local, regional recruitment has often meant that 
units recruited in a particular location retain clan allegiance.”87 Al-Shabaab is able to 
mitigate the negative aspects of clannism to both unify diverse clans and empower minority 
clans by allowing members to take on senior leadership positions and guard against 
traditionally oppressive clans.88 
In addition to Al-Shabaab’s manipulation of clannism to gain societal control, Al-
Shabaab also exploits Somalia’s failed state environment by addressing poverty and 
establishing rule of law. On the basis of Islamism, Al-Shabaab provides social services in 
regions under its control.89 According to Mwangi, “Shabaab provides education and 
training, justice and security, food and alms distribution, local-level administration and 
public works, and employment. Education is not available for many Somalis and Al-
Shabaab plays a growing role in the education sector. In many areas of the country, it is 
the only organization that provides education – although only an ‘Islamic’ education, with 
a limited and fundamentalist curriculum.”90 The provision of these services in 
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impoverished regions enables Al-Shabaab to gain legitimacy and support from the local 
community.91 
Al-Shabaab highlights the failures of both Somalia’s government and AMISOM to 
uphold rule of law consistently throughout Somalia and seeks to provide an alternative 
forms of justice under its version of Islamic rule.92 As Hansen characterizes it, Al-
Shabaab’s strength remains “the inclination for law and order that its ideology created, 
highly popular amongst ordinary Somalis.”93 In contrast, Al-Shabaab accuses AMISOM 
and Somalia’s government of being apostate, occupying forces intent on meddling in the 
affairs of Somalia’s population.94 As an additional means of enforcing Al-Shabaab’s 
control and delegitimizing Somalia’s government, Al-Shabaab successfully employs its 
intelligence branch, the Amniyat, throughout the country.95 This powerful force pervades 
all aspects of life in Somalia and has even infiltrated the ranks within AMISOM, 
controlling the Somali populous through targeted assassinations and fear.96 Al-Shabaab’s 
quasi-state functions seek to both undermine government control as well as gain legitimacy 
as an organization. 
2. Somali Refugees and Regional Diaspora 
Throughout the East African region, a number of countries support a Somali 
diaspora and refugees with a wide variance in treatment. Kenya remains by far the largest 
and most influential host and both the Somali diaspora and Al-Shabaab play a significant 
role in Kenya’s stability. Within Kenya, Al-Shabaab’s sympathizers and affiliated network, 
known as Al-Hijra, facilitate Al-Shabaab through recruitment, training, and radicalization 
efforts among Kenya’s vulnerable populations.97 
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For over 26 years, the government of Kenya has hosted between 300,000 to 400,000 
Somali refugees consistently in Kenya’s largest refugee camp Dadaab and self-settled 
throughout the country.98 Kenya’s overlapping cultural ties along the Somali-Kenyan 
border as well as Somalia’s geographic proximity are driving forces behind Kenya’s 
enormous refugee numbers.99 Nyongesa Ikanda describes the intertwined cultural ties 
between the two countries: “Somali locals and refugees originate from a patrilineal, 
Islamic, nomadic pastoralist group divided into clans, sub-clans and lineages.”100 As such, 
when environmental disasters such as drought and famine or violent conflicts erupt in the 
surrounding region, Kenya often sees large increases in population movements to refugee 
camps or nearby communities with family ties.101 These historically interwoven 
demographic ties encourage the Kenyan government to preserve good relations with ethnic 
Somalis living within their borders as the security of the Somali diaspora often impacts 
Kenyan state security.  
Unfortunately, the Kenyan state has indicated on multiple occasions its 
unwillingness to ensure the safety and security of ethnic Somalis. Since 2011, the Kenyan 
government has failed to uphold the rights of ethnic Somalis as evident in their heavy-
handed counterterror operations and limited assistance against threats to close the Dadaab 
refugee camp.102 Consistently the Kenyan government has enacted operations that 
indiscriminately detain or kill suspected Al-Shabaab members and supporters among a 
primarily ethnic Somali population while stringently upholding ethnic Kenyan’s rights.103 
In addition, Kenya’s historic demographic profiling among ethnic Somalis living in Kenya 
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and ultimate unjust treatment of these groups only exacerbate existing tensions between 
the Somali diaspora and host country.104 The failure of the Kenyan government to fairly 
enforce rule of law along ethnic-religious lines only further incites suspicion, 
disenfranchisement, and animosity among the Somali diaspora.105 In addition, the 
significance of Dadaab refugee camp to Somali refugees’ survival means that threats of 
camp closure, overcrowding, and poor conditions foster refugees’ resentment towards the 
state.106 This social isolation whether in a refugee camp, ethnic community settlement, or 
neighborhood in town fuels further discontent against the host nation and receptiveness to 
more extreme messages to improve the situation.107  
Within this environment, Somali refugees and diaspora remain extremely 
vulnerable to exploitation, not only by state actors but also non-state actors including Al-
Shabaab. The desperate conditions within the refugee camps mean that well-connected 
individuals—such as those associated with terrorist organizations—may be able to provide 
resources or opportunities and thus develop sympathies among the refugee population.108 
For example, there is evidence Al-Shabaab often offers youths the prospect of earning an 
income whereas the Kenyan state offers refugees little opportunity to provide for their own 
livelihood.109 In other cases, Al-Shabaab has shown its ability to shift its messaging to 
increase the likelihood of Somalis joining the cause or providing tacit support.110 
According to Yahya, Al-Shabaab is able to target distinct vulnerabilities among individuals 
through this strategy: “For the unemployed or the poor, they offer paid jobs; for 
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marginalized ethnic and religious minorities, they offer recourse through violence; and for 
the middle class, they offer an adventure, a sense of ‘purpose,’ and an escape from 
mundanity.”111 This flexible approach offers Al-Shabaab a tailored technique for reaching 
individuals among Somalia’s displaced populations throughout the region, but nowhere is 
this more evident than in Kenya. 
In Kenya, Petrich and Donnelly explain Al-Shabaab’s calculated actions: “Al-
Shabaab is filling a governance void in coastal Kenya and in the slum districts of Nairobi 
by providing jobs, expelling or redirecting people the community perceives to be a threat, 
and offering a sense of collective identity.”112 Even terrorist attacks the group conducts 
can be seen as opportunities for the group to obtain credibility and notoriety among the 
Somali diaspora.113 Successful attacks can prove Al-Shabaab’s powerful commitment 
towards their cause while also spreading fear against any moderates who would dare 
oppose it.114 These factors ultimately enable Al-Shabaab to exploit the Somali diaspora 
throughout the East African region, but especially in Kenya where the ethnic Somali 
minority group remains a highly vulnerable population. 
In Kenya specifically, Al-Shabaab maintains a strategy of working to radicalize 
Somali refugees in camps as well as ethnic Somalis self-settled in Kenya’s urban center. 
As the unification of “Greater Somalia,” of which territory in Kenya holds a key position, 
remains a fervent goal, Al-Shabaab’s pursuit of jihad within Kenya is a priority 
objective.115 In contrast, although both Ethiopia and Djibouti offers Al-Shabaab a similar 
opportunity to pursue its goal of “Greater Somalia,” Al-Shabaab’s targeting and expansion 
into Kenya offers several strategic advantages for the terrorist organization.116 Kenya’s 
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higher visibility and large Somali diaspora allow Al-Shabaab a potential recruitment base 
and well publicized attacks to increase the group’s notoriety—all of which serve Al-
Shabaab’s strategic objective of expanding their version of an Islamic caliphate.117 
According to Cannon and Ruto Pkalya, “Al-Shabaab targets and attacks Kenya in a highly 
rational way based on cost-benefit analyses and the presence of ample opportunity spaces 
that factor in a number of geo-strategic and geo-political reasons.”118 Additionally, 
Kenya’s refugee camp offers Al-Shabaab a strategic location to conduct their operations 
with minimal interference.119 The isolated and separate environment that refugee camps 
offer allow terrorists concealment for illicit activities such as weapons proliferation, 
smuggling activities, and recruitment among the disenfranchised Somali youth.120 In this 
way, the Somali diaspora remain a highly vulnerable but attractive population for Al-
Shabaab to exploit as it furthers its strategic goals not only in Kenya but throughout the 
Horn of Africa region. 
Unfortunately, as previously discussed, many nations including Kenya play into 
Al-Shabaab’s hands by exacting harsh counterterror tactics and failing to uphold the rights 
of displaced Somalis. Cannon and Ruto Pkalya classify Kenya’s difficult situation: 
“Kenya’s heavy-handed tactics against its Somali and Muslim communities have led to 
widespread anger and have arguably had the effect of radicalizing a portion of Kenya’s 
youth, assisting in the presence of terror cells within Kenya and Kenyan foreign fighters in 
al-Shabaab.”121 As such, displaced Somalis’ grievances are compounded along ethnic and 
religious lines, and individuals who may have been otherwise peaceful become 
ideologically susceptible to Al-Shabaab’s message.  
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D. AL-SHABAAB’S POWER MECHANISMS 
1. Financial Mechanisms 
One primary aspect of Al-Shabaab’s success and resilience remains its ability to 
implement financial mechanisms that shift from quasi-state functions to criminal practices 
while appealing to the local cultural environment and exploiting religious tenets when 
convenient. This section will discuss Al-Shabaab’s organizational attributes and financial 
strategies and define how the use of internal and external funding sources allow the group 
to exploit local populations and continue to pose a significant regional threat.  
a. Al-Shabaab’s External Funding Mechanisms: Remittance, Hawala & 
Mobile Money 
Somalia’s financial environment offers an additional avenue for Al-Shabaab to 
exploit to their purpose. The Somali economy currently receives over $3.1 billion annually, 
or approximately 20 percent of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from remittances sent 
from the Somali diaspora located in Europe, the Americas, or elsewhere in the Middle 
East.122 In the World Bank vulnerability assessment for Somalia, Pape and Karamba 
identify the most prevalent process by which remittances are transferred in Somalia: the 
informal money transfer service known as the hawala system.123 El-Qorchi provides a 
definition for this financial transfer service prevalent throughout the Middle East, North 
Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Indian subcontinent: “The hawala system refers to an 
informal channel for transferring funds from one location to another through service 
providers — known as hawaladars — regardless of the nature of the transaction and the 
countries involved. While hawala transactions are mostly initiated by emigrant workers 
living in a developed country, the hawala system can also be used to send funds from a 
developing country.”124  
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This system operates outside of the traditional banking sector for practical 
accessibility purposes and the vast majority of hawala operators and both sending and 
receiving customers are legal and legitimate.125 This is important as according to 
Somalia’s Vulnerability Assessment: “Remittances can help reduce poverty, increase 
access to health and education services, and promote household savings. Remittance-
receiving households are less likely to be poor compared to the households that do not 
receive remittances. Somalis continue to transfer funds to family left behind and invest 
back home to support the recovery of the country.”126 Somalia’s extensive hawala system 
offers the nation’s impoverished population an accessible remittance option due to the 
highly liquid and timely manner of the process.127  
Although this remittance process has widespread legitimate applications and is 
essential for the economic success of the country of Somalia, the international community 
considers this sector as high risk for terrorist financing and money laundering.128 The 
limited ability to regulate remittance service providers and the absence of government 
oversight allows these cash transfers to take place without following “know your client” 
norms or knowing the legitimacy of the sender or final customer.129  
Because of the potential for anonymity and minimal tracking, hawalas have been 
attractive targets for individuals who seek to hide their activities including those supporting 
terrorist or criminal elements.130 Looney describes the vulnerabilities of the financial 
transfer system: “Given its size and semi-legitimate status… it is not hard for terrorists to 
transfer money using the hawala channel. They are labyrinths replete with pseudonyms, 
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middlemen and dead ends. Wealthy Arab patrons in the Middle East likely send funds to 
al-Qaeda through hawala organizations, as do myriad Arab charities acting as fund-raising 
fronts. The smaller the value of the transfer, the less attention it is likely to attract, but it is 
still easy to transfer large amounts of money without raising questions.”131 This vulnerable 
process is simply a way of life and the norm in Somalia as is the constant risk of 
exploitation by Al-Shabaab and any other nefarious actors. 
This person-to-person money transfer service is supplemented by the growing use 
of mobile money transfer services in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region for the 
transmission of remittances. Odundo Owuor explains the history of mobile money in the 
region: “Mobile money initially started as a simple exchange of airtime credit between 
users. Over 10 years ago, mobile network operators formalized this by offering mobile 
money services. It was quickly perceived as a convenient and safe way of making 
transactions and storing money.” 132 Currently 87 percent of international transfers through 
hawala networks while only 12 percent of international transfer are through mobile 
phones.133  
Domestically however, mobile money use is widespread. Odundo Owuor states, 
“About 155 million mobile money transactions take place every month. It’s used for a wide 
range of things. One of the most common is to pay bills for purchases between $2 and 
$300. Mobile money is thus far more widely used than cash. Two-thirds of those surveyed 
use it to pay for items like water, electricity and charcoal. A third claim to use it to buy 
groceries, durable goods and livestock.”134 Despite this widespread use, mobile money 
transfers present similar security, tracking, and documentation challenges as hawala 
networks. 
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“[Mobile money] is vulnerable to money laundering and terrorism financing. This 
is because there is a weak ‘know your customer’ compliance, in line with global banking 
standards, meaning few SIM cards and mobile money accounts are registered using a valid 
form of identification. Ultimately, this results in limited accountability and tractability,” 
according to Odundo Owuor.135 Pape and Karamba further elaborate on the nature of 
mobile money transfers specifically in Somalia:  
The use of mobile phone has been limited to domestic money transfers. This 
is mainly because of concerns about money laundering and terrorist 
financing related to cross-border remittances. However, these technologies 
have the potential to vastly improve access to both remittances and broader 
financial services, including low-cost savings and credit products, for 
Somali migrants and remittance recipients in the country.136  
Within Somalia, currently 46 percent of remittances use mobile money domestically but 
this number has the potential to go up dramatically as technology improves.137 
Unfortunately, international mobile money transfers face additional challenges relating to 
anti-money laundering regulations that have limited the number of service providers and 
increased costs dramatically.138 Pape and Karamba note, “while remittances provide a 
lifeline for the poor, sending money to Somalia is costly” which “encourages the use of 
informal channels.”139  
b. Al-Shabaab’s Internal Funding Mechanism: Taxation System 
Al-Shabaab takes full advantage of the use of these informal financial transaction 
channels, evident in their ability to adapt and exploit the changing economic environment 
within Somalia. Mobile money’s most significant usage for Al-Shabaab is its role in the 
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structure and function of the organization’s taxation system.140 While external remittances 
decreased from Somali diaspora over the past decade, Al-Shabaab resorted to extortion and 
established a tax system of Somali citizen in areas under the organization’s territorial 
control.141  
The Hiraal Institute describes the innovative approach Al-Shabaab has taken to 
Somalia’s financial situation: “Al-Shabab has built a resilient and far-reaching financial 
network that has been able to withstand regular army and Special Forces attacks. With its 
roots dug deep into the local communities, the group has managed to replace and reposition 
tax collectors as necessary. On some major roads, the group conducts its tax collection 
even without having a permanent presence.”142 The informal financial sector allows Al-
Shabaab to essentially function as a shadow government with functions such as tax 
collection, checkpoint operations, and Islamic court functions, all enforced through mafia-
style coercion and violence.143 
Al-Shabaab’s taxation system in southern and central Somalia remains systematic 
and centralized and is funded through a diverse set of sources including, “four distinct 
revenue streams: taxation of farms and agricultural produce (dalag), registration and 
taxation of transiting vehicles (gadiid), taxation of goods being transported (badeeco) and 
taxation of livestock sales (xoolo),” according to Umarov of the UN Monitoring Group on 
Somalia and Eritrea.144 Al-Shabaab’s taxation structure includes two departments: the 
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Zakawaat Office, which collects non-monetary tax such as agricultural goods and 
livestock, and the Finance Office, which manages the collection of all monetary taxes.145  
The Zakawaat Office directs Al-Shabaab militants and supporting clan elders to 
operate during a collection season, typically the month of Ramadan, and to collect livestock 
uniformly across southern and central Somalia, including territory Al-Shabaab does not 
hold.146 Meanwhile Al-Shabaab’s Finance Office manages the collection of monetary 
taxes through frequent assessments of shops and warehouses in urban centers under the 
organization’s control and extorting 2.5% of the total assessed value of the goods, the zakat 
or alms rate.147 In addition, the Finance Office operates roadside checkpoints, which tax 
all vehicles and transported goods at the same taxation rate.148 
“At every level, collection of revenue is tightly controlled and internally monitored 
and audited. Al-Shabaab’s domestic revenue generation apparatus is more geographically 
diversified and systematic than that of the Somali Federal Government or the federal 
member states,” Umarov explains.149 Even in areas outside of their territorial control, Al-
Shabaab maintains a “sophisticated accounting system” using multiple informal financial 
transfer systems including: “internal transfers using cash (both United States dollars and 
Somali shillings), mobile money, hawala money transfer and possibly bank accounts.” 150  
The widespread use of the mobile money transfer service eliminates the need for 
Al-Shabaab to transport their tax revenue through territory outside of their control.151 In 
addition, Levy and Yusuf describe Al-Shabaab’s methods of extorting tribal leadership and 
merchants in regions outside of the organization’s control, “Al-Shabaab has recently begun 
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demanding payments from leaders of Somali clans and businesses based outside of its 
territory. The expansion of Amniyaat and the creation of an effective auditing system have 
enabled this practice.”152 The Amniyat, Al-Shabaab’s intelligence arm, enables the group 
to confront any resistance from uncooperative individuals with threats of kidnapping for 
ransom or death.153 
Al-Shabaab’s relationship with illicit charcoal smuggling in the region similarly 
evolved based on the conditions within Somalia’s unique environment. The United Nations 
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea describes Al-Shabaab’s historical revenue from 
illicit charcoal smuggling: “The charcoal trade continues to be a significant source of 
revenue for Al-Shabaab, generating at least $7.5 million from checkpoint taxation in 
Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions. The systematic taxation of charcoal exports at the 
ports of Buur Gaabo and Kismayo also continues to generate significant illicit revenue for 
the Jubbaland administration.”154  
Despite the continued income for the organization the Monitoring Group identified 
that Somali charcoal exports significantly declined with a 25% reduction in 2018.155 The 
Hiraal Institute again provides an explanation for the situation: “While financially it would 
make sense for the group [Al-Shabaab] to engage in the charcoal trade, they banned it 
because they considered it more profitable for the authorities in Kismayo [the Somali 
government] than for themselves.” Instead Al-Shabaab found a more lucrative approach in 
checkpoint operations rather than Al-Shabaab members smuggling goods including 
charcoal: “[Al-Shabaab] has banned charcoal and accordingly hunts down charcoal traders, 
impounds their cargo and cars, and charges them hefty fines. Members who are involved 
in facilitating the charcoal trade have been arrested and some killed by the group.”156 
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Similarly, Al-Shabaab’s association with piracy in the Gulf of Aden illustrates their 
adaptability to link with criminality when convenient.157 As true opportunists, Al-Shabaab 
maintains relationships with individuals involved with piracy when financially beneficial 
but there is no credible evidence that the group itself conducts maritime attacks 
firsthand.158 Petrich notes Al-Shabaab’s role in Horn of Africa piracy, “Rather than 
executing any significant command and control over the operations, al-Shabaab seems to 
have approached maritime piracy in the same way as it addressed all other revenue 
generating activity within its area of operation: by taxing those involved, based on the sums 
they wrestled from European and American insurance companies.”159 This rational 
approach allows Al-Shabaab to benefit from any operations while limiting any risk or 
resources expended to conduct the attacks. 
In regions where Al-Shabaab maintains territorial control, operating checkpoints 
offer a viable means of obtaining necessary revenue. Although Al-Shabaab employs mafia-
style tactics to coerce transiting individuals to comply with the risk of execution for 
noncompliance, Al-Shabaab’s taxation checkpoints are implemented consistently and 
predictably, even offering receipts for taxes paid.160 “In contrast to checkpoints controlled 
by the Somali Federal Government or federal member state forces, Al-Shabaab does not 
doubly tax drivers who have paid at another location. As a result, commercial drivers often 
prefer transiting via checkpoints controlled by Al-Shabaab, rather than federal or regional 
forces,” Umarov explains.161 In addition, the financial benefit for Al-Shabaab remains 
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significant. According to Nichols, the organization earns approximately $30,000 each day 
or over $10 million per year from Al-Shabaab’s most lucrative checkpoint alone.162 
One of the primary reasons that Al-Shabaab’s taxation system remains so 
successful is the organization’s ability to understand Somalia’s culture and then integrate 
within Somalia’s clan-based society. In addition, Petrich explains, “To transcend Somalia’s 
historically fractious clan relationships, Al-Shabaab seeks cohesion through the framework 
of Islam.”163 Al-Shabaab recognizes the preexisting order and structure within Somalia’s 
village communities and coopts these clan leaders to implement Al-Shabaab’s taxation and 
policing requirements.164  
Levy and Yusef explain why Somalia’s clan elders would be enticed to follow Al-
Shabaab’s requests: “In return, al-Shabaab refrains from punishing cooperative clans, 
facilitates arbitration of inter-tribal disputes, and provides financial assistance to some 
clans. Some elders residing outside of al-Shabaab territory or in areas formerly under the 
group’s control have cooperated with it out of desire for financial gain, fear of punishment, 
and ideological affinity.”165 With the loyalty and compliance of clan elders, Al-Shabaab 
can exploit their cultural ties and loyalty to perform a wide variety of activities on behalf 
of the group including: “transfer of funds collected from fellow tribesmen, sharing of 
intelligence, and recruitment of youth to the group” and more ominously “report the names 
of uncooperative community members, whom al-Shabaab may threaten with extortion, 
imprisonment, or death.”166 
Al-Shabaab’s Salafi-jihadist ideological appeal and religious underpinnings 
provide an additional lever for coercing Somalia’s population to do their bidding through 
the taxation system. Al-Shabaab uses the term zakah or zakat to describe the tax and 
extortion that they impose at a fixed rate in accordance with sharia law: 2.5% tax on all 
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agricultural produce and $50 fixed tax per hectare of land holdings.167 The Hiraal Institute 
further explains the zakat process for traders passing through Al-Shabaab territory, “The 
owner is then contacted by the Finance Department, which asks him about his annual 
revenue (not profit). If the answer is ridiculously low, his shipment is impounded; if the 
answer is reasonable, it is calculated that he owns up to three times the amount he specified, 
and is taxed 2.5% of that amount. The second method is applied to traders in areas 
controlled by the government and whose goods do not go through or to AS territory. These 
are reported on by [Al-Shabaab] informants; finance officials then call them and order them 
to pay the zakah.”168  
An additional tax collection known as infaaq is extracted in specific regional 
administrations to support deficits in budget or provide support for military offensives 
again claims to have a religious basis but in reality can be seen as a predatory practice.169 
As with zakat, the use of Somali clan leadership to carry out collection allows Al-Shabaab 
to maintain influence throughout the region and ensures operations both military and 
administrative continue regardless of true territorial control. By distorting the Islamic tenet 
of both zakat and infaaq as justification for Al-Shabaab’s tax collection, Al-Shabaab 
manipulates a primarily Muslim Somali populous into compliance while maintaining the 
threat of property destruction and personal or family member execution for any 
disobedience.170 
2. Intelligence Apparatus 
Another characteristic of Al-Shabaab’s organizational power, Al-Shabaab’s 
intelligence and security arm, known as the Amniyat, provides a deeply entrenched 
information collection and enforcement mechanism. The following section will review the 
Amniyat’s mission and function, its historical development, recruitment and training 
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processes, and specialized branches to coerce the local population and confront external 
adversaries. 
a. Mission and Area of Operation 
Al-Shabaab’s clandestine Amniyat network serves as both an intelligence 
collection and special operations function directly answerable to Al-Shabaab’s emir.171 
According to the UN Monitoring Group, “An underlying structure, the Amniyat integrates 
the functions of a secret police, responsible for counter-intelligence and political control, 
and a clandestine special operations unit conducting assassinations and suicide attacks.”172 
Current estimates place Amniyat membership between 500 and 1,000 hardcore jihadists, 
and the network’s reach spans beyond Somalia into Kenya and covertly infiltrating all 
levels of Somali society including government and security services.173  
b. Historical Origins 
The Amniyat’s origins began in the spring of 2009 in the aftermath of the Ethiopian 
withdrawal and the transition to Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) control 
of Mogadishu.174 During this period, Al-Shabaab suffered defections as disillusioned 
members viewed Al-Shabaab’s struggle as complete with the withdrawal of Somalia’s 
historical enemy, Ethiopia.175 In this atmosphere of potential decline, Al-Shabaab 
established the Amniyat, comprised almost entirely of local Somali jihadists, as a secret 
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police to systematically track down and kill former members and their families to instill 
fear in any others who considered defection.176 
As Al-Shabaab grew in size and strength in the coming year, the Amniyat also 
expanded in its role and function, all under Godane’s command. At the behest of the emir, 
the Amniyat acted as a separate entity within the organization, outside the control of Al-
Shabaab’s executive council.177 Godane shaped the Amniyat for long-term survival as the 
UN Monitoring Group reports: “Financial and technical resources are increasingly 
concentrated in the Amniyat … Amniyat functions mostly independently from the rest of 
Al-Shabaab, through its own chain of command, logistics network and financial resources. 
It therefore has the capacity to operate discretely, gather intelligence and strike effectively 
throughout Somalia, specifically in areas under AMISOM/Federal Government of Somalia 
control, spreading fear even within Al-Shabaab.”178 The Amniyat’s secrecy and terrifying 
ability to deliver garnered Al-Shabaab increasing power, influence, and even tacit support 
throughout the region. 
c. Recruitment and Training 
Initial training for potential Amniyat members often begins with the standard 
training for new Al-Shabaab recruits: “New Al-Shabaab recruits initially receive three 
months of basic military training, which can be reduced to a month if there are pressures 
at the frontline for more troops. Thereafter, some trainees continue to take specialized 
courses in assembling IEDs, sniping, or guerrilla warfare,” according to Sook.179 From 
here, Al-Shabaab selects candidates for its elite Amniyat force based on the recruit’s 
demonstrated skill or promise for strategic thinking, with most members around 20 years 
old and holding clan connections to Al-Shabaab leadership.180 Once chosen, new Amniyat 
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operatives will be assigned menial tasks, such as drivers for foreign fighters or 
strategically-placed informants until the jihadists can prove their reliability.181 When the 
junior operatives demonstrate their credibility, they receive high salaries with their 
expenses covered, and transition to more specialized training for placement within the 
Amniyat’s distinct units.182 
d. Hierarchy and Branches 
The Amniyat’s hierarchical structure begins with the central command, followed 
by regional commanders, then separate units for intelligence collection, assassinations, and 
various suicide attacks, each supported with logistical and financial support units.183 
According to Sook, “Each Amniyat unit is autonomous… and in principle unaware of other 
groups, for security reasons in case of arrest and interrogation. Intelligence is collected by 
smaller units, or even lone operatives, and transmitted to the unit commander, who then 
transmits necessary information to assassination or suicide squads to prepare 
operations.”184 The high degree of operational security and specialization allows for a 
competent force and successful military operations. 
The Amniyat’s intelligence unit, also known as Mukhabarad, is responsible for 
surveillance for attack operations.185 For long term attack planning, the Mukhabarad plants 
spies months in advance on strategic targets, such as the presidential palace, TFG garrisons, 
or AMISOM bases, to collect information on pattern of life and identify vulnerabilities.186 
Historically, this unit has successfully infiltrated Somali government and security services 
by targeting specific individuals with death threats.187 As TFG institutions are incapable 
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of providing internal security, the individuals often share unauthorized or classified 
material rather than risk their lives or that of their families.188 
The Amniyat’s assassination or “quick reaction” units, known as the Jugta Ulus, 
act as well-armed commando teams.189 In active battle, the unit supports conventional Al-
Shabaab units by carrying out critical tactical action to favor an Al-Shabaab victory.190 To 
accomplish this goal, Jugta Ulus members carry heavy weaponry, including RPGs, 
bazookas, recoilless rifles, and heavy machine guns, and have even succeeded in taking 
down enemy aircraft and helicopters in the past.191 
The Amniyat’s next two units focus on suicide operations, or Mutafajirad, with the 
subgroups of the Amaliya Ishtihhad specializing in traditional suicide missions while the 
Amaliya Inqimas conducts suicide assaults.192 Traditional suicide operations involve one 
or two individuals attacking a target with bombs strapped to their bodies or vehicles.193 
Meanwhile, more complex suicide assaults include four to ten individuals with orders not 
to return alive.194 According to Maruf and Joseph, the Amaliya Inqimas suicide tactics, 
first used by the Taliban, became Al-Shabaab’s favored method, include “a suicide car 
bomber, with the rest being commandos who attacked the target with guns and grenades 
following the bomb blast. The attackers all wore suicide belts and were supposed to blow 
themselves up when they ran out of ammunition.”195 Attacks on targets such as the Somali 
parliament, UN headquarters, Presidential palace, and Garissa University followed this 
methodology.196 
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To become a member of the Amaliya Inqimas, recruits undergo rigorous combat 
training and psychological indoctrination.197 Maruf and Joseph describe the separate 
treatment this force receives, “Just before the operation, Shabaab would assign them 
bodyguards to give them a feeling of importance. They were also given money and 
women—and told that even more women would be available in the eternal life that 
followed once they carried out their mission. The incentives and psychological training 
were so extreme that in some cases members in the unit competed with each other for the 
right to carry out suicide mission. Those who were chosen were congratulated by the 
others.”198 The extreme training and indoctrination create jihadists unquestioned in their 
historic lethality and efficacy.  
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III. CASE STUDY 1: WITHDRAWAL POST-RAMADAN 
OFFENSIVE 
The following case study will review the events that transpired, leading up to Al-
Shabaab’s notable low point, the group’s withdrawal post-Ramadan Offensive in 2010, and 
their subsequent resurgence. The first section will provide a summary of key events and 
Al-Shabaab’s response followed by the application of Hypothesis 1: Organizational 
Attribute, Hypothesis 2: Political Context, and Hypothesis 3: Failed Counterterrorism 
approaches, respectively, to examine why Al-Shabaab was able to endure after this setback. 
In this case study, Al-Shabaab’s failed Ramadan Offensive will be considered the group’s 
‘shock.’ The major attack conducted on the Westgate mall in Nairobi, Kenya, in 2013 will 
be considered the group’s successful rebound point. Each hypothesis will consider what 
factors enabled Al-Shabaab’s successful rebound from the shock of the Ramadan 
Offensive’s failure in order to determine the validity of each hypothesis. Finally, this case 
study will evaluate Al-Shabaab’s critical variables for resiliency as assessed from each 
approach. 
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS 
The events leading up to Al-Shabaab’s noted low point in 2010 began when the 
group conducted a large-scale, highly coordinated attack in Kampala, Uganda, on July 11, 
2010.199 In total, at least 74 people were killed and dozens more wounded as two suicide 
bombers targeted separate watch parties for the 2010 World Cup finals in Uganda’s capital 
city.200 Soon afterward, an Al-Shabaab spokesman claimed responsibility for the 
attack.201  
The attack provoked widespread outrage, and Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni 
announced retaliatory actions, the most significant being the push for the African Union to 
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expand its Somalia mission deployment size and upgrade its mandate from peacekeeping 
to peace enforcement.202 “In late 2009, Ugandan officials had threatened to remove their 
troops unless the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG) started to stabilize 
the country. However, after the attacks, Museveni sounded a much more determined note. 
‘We were just in Mogadishu to guard the port, the airport, and the State House,’ he said 
four days after the blast. ‘Now they have mobilized us to look for them. We are going to 
go on the offensive [against] all those who did this,’” according to Maruf and Joseph.203 
Although the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) did not upgrade its mandate 
at the time, multiple African nations, including Uganda and Burundi, pledged additional 
troop deployments and reinvigorated the alliance’s resolve to eradicate Al-Shabaab.204 
Meanwhile, Al-Shabaab pressed forward with its own goals. With the start of 
Ramadan in August, Al-Shabaab issued a declaration of war and a call to arms against 
AMISOM and the TFG via Mogadishu radio stations.205 Al-Shabaab’s spokesman likened 
AMISOM and the TFG to Christians and apostates and accused the alliances of violating 
Somali territory and dignity while committing atrocities against Somali women and 
children.206 With these bold accusations, Al-Shabaab sought to apply propaganda to unite 
Somalis against a foreign occupying force.207 The new Al-Shabaab Ramadan offensive 
would be known as Nihayat Al-Mu’tadin, or “The End of the Aggressors.” 208 
At the time, Al-Shabaab believed it could take the strategic advantage as the TFG’s 
forces comprised approximately 1,500 personnel and remained disorganized and poorly 
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disciplined.209 While AMISOM held between 7,200 to 9,200 troops, the placement of the 
troop deployment suffered logistical vulnerabilities, including its ability to quickly 
resupply.210 Al-Shabaab sought to exploit this weakness.211 In preparation for the 
Ramadan Offensive, Al-Shabaab had stockpiled resources with weapons confiscated from 
AMISOM and TFG members.212 Simultaneously, they consolidated manpower in 
Mogadishu through the calculated employment of foreign fighters.213 
However, AMISOM and the TFG proved to be far more potent than Al-Shabaab 
estimated. Uganda’s recent reinforcements, including main battle tanks, were highly 
effective.214 In the months that followed, AMISOM was able to take control of strategic 
locations in Mogadishu, including the Bakara market, the former Ministry of Defense, and 
other vital positions formerly held by Al-Shabaab.215 AMISOM’s tactical victories 
succeeded in cutting off Al-Shabaab’s principal income source of the Bakara market, while 
militarily Al-Shabaab suffered heavy losses and was unable to resupply itself.216 
For Al-Shabaab, the 2010 Ramadan Offensive ultimately ended in profound failure. 
According to Hansen, “In many ways Al-Shabaab was in a state of disarray; according to 
AMISOM sources, it had more than 25 percent of its fighters put out of action, and many 
top leaders were dead. It had also spent large sums on the Ramadan offensive, and 
increased its taxation and the use of forced recruitment. Al-Shabaab was in turmoil.”217 
All in all, Al-Shabaab had overreached with grand plans and bold strikes but no positive 
results or strategic gains.218 
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This failure incited a significant leadership crisis among Al-Shabaab membership, 
as both lower-level leaders and members of Al-Shabaab’s ally Hizbul Islam questioned Al-
Shabaab’s emir Godane’s legitimacy and capacity for command.219 “The fact that it was 
Godane who planned the ill-fated offensive, and was the strategist behind the centralization 
efforts, meant that the September defeat damaged his status as a leader, and his leadership 
was now contested,” Hansen writes.220 The crisis provoked schisms along both ideological 
and clan-based lines. 
Ideologically, reformist-minded Islamists believed Al-Shabaab was a vehicle for 
security and sharia-based stability in Somalia.221 The failure of the Ramadan Offensive 
brought to the surface ideological issues, including Al-Shabaab’s use of forced taxation 
and recruitment, as well as the permissibility of killing civilians during suicide attacks.222 
The more moderate Islamists among Al-Shabaab’s ranks vehemently disagreed with these 
activities, and multiple high-ranking members contacted AMISOM to defect in the fallout 
of the Ramadan Offensive.223  
Al-Shabaab’s clan-based schism also manifested under the pressure of military 
defeat. According to Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, and Sheehan, “Sheikh Mukhtar 
Robow—a senior al-Shabaab leader and member of the Rahanweyn clan, which makes up 
around 70 percent of the militia’s foot soldiers—became incensed that his clan bore the 
brunt of the casualties.”224 The majority of the 500 to 700 Al-Shabaab members killed 
were affiliated with the Rahanweyn clan, and Maruf and Joseph claim, “Observers noted 
 
219 Maruf and Joseph, 162. 
220 Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 103. 
221 Hansen, 105. 
222 Hansen, 105; Maruf and Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab, 191. 
223 Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 105. 
224 Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, Shiraz Maher, and James Sheehan, “Lights, Camera, Jihad: Al-
Shabaab’s Western Media Strategy” (London: The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and 
Political Violence, 2012), 20, https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/ICSR-Report-Lights-Camera-
Jihad-al-Shabaab%E2%80%99s-Western-Media-Strategy.pdf. 
45 
that Robow’s fighters had manned the frontlines during most of the campaigns, while 
foreigners and Somalis from other regions kept a safe distance.”225  
These accusations only further widened rifts within the group and called into 
question Godane’s tactical choices. Previous Al-Shabaab victories capitalized on the speed 
and flexibility of hit and run and terror attacks while the Ramadan Offensive was fought 
with far more conventional tactics.226 Worse, Maruf and Joseph indicate Godane may have 
used the fighting to opportunistically target his internal opposition: “There were also 
reports that at the height of the offensive, Shabaab’s Amniyat force deliberately shot 
wounded fighters, including some commanders, ostensibly so they would die and achieve 
martyrdom… But many suspected that in actuality the Amniyat was settling scores for 
Godane.”227  
Godane’s next move shifted the focus away from Al-Shabaab’s internal conflicts 
and personal leadership criticism towards Al-Shabaab’s next tactical step: the withdrawal 
from Mogadishu.228 In August 2011, the Al-Shabaab spokesman announced the group 
would be conducting a tactical withdrawal from Mogadishu to usher in a new phase of 
fighting against AMISOM and the TFG.229 Al-Shabaab attempted to portray the decision 
as militarily advantageous rather than a retreat.230 Godane claimed Al-Shabaab would 
more effectively target their adversaries through hit-and-run and guerrilla-style tactics, but 
ultimately the withdrawal was a sign of defeat.231 
At this point, Al-Shabaab was in a highly weakened state suffering internal discord, 
facing significant military defeats, and retreating from major urban centers, yet within two 
years would go on to conduct one of the group’s most successful operations: the attack on 
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Kenya’s Westgate mall. “On September 21, 2013, masked gunmen attacked the upscale 
Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya, taking hostages and killing at least 67 people. 
Almost 200 people, including at least 5 U.S. citizens, were wounded in the siege, which 
lasted four days,” according to Ploch Blanchard.232 The success of the attack reversed 
assessments that Al-Shabaab was a flailing organization, overcome by internal divisions 
and doomed to fail.233 How was Al-Shabaab able to rebuild from such a severe low point, 
and what can be understood about the sources of the group’s resilience? The following 
sections examine these factors.  
B. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 1: ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
1. Organizational Cohesion 
In response to the organizational fracturing after the failure of the Ramadan 
offensive, Godane followed a multi-pronged approach to allow the group to rebound: first, 
he worked to purge the group of rivals and dissidents; secondly, he refocused the group on 
the new phase of guerrilla warfare post-Mogadishu withdrawal, and finally, reorganized 
the group to external attack planning, all of which necessitated organizational cohesion.234 
In purging his rivals and internal political dissidents, Godane applied the methodology 
outlined by Marchal to “use the conflict to covert the targeted killing of potential 
opponents,” starting first with influential elders and civil society members, then including 
more moderate members.235 By expelling or killing internal opponents, Godane sought to 
remove an unnecessary liability and ensured the solidarity and trustworthiness of those that 
remained.236  
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To implement this strategy and prevent Al-Shabaab’s fragmentation in the chaos 
post-Ramadan offensive, Godane required political support from local pro-jihadi 
scholars.237 By early 2013, Godane received his answer: a pro-Godane cleric announced a 
fatwa that those who defied the emir or “sowed discord among the mujahideen” would face 
elimination.238 This religious backing provided Godane the justification he needed for 
action. As Maruf and Joseph note: “Godane soon acted on the fatwa by issuing a notice to 
his opponents…It warned certain individuals were working with the infidels to sabotage 
jihad, and conspiring against the mujahideen. It was understood by all who read it that 
those individuals were in mortal danger.”239 Among others, Godane’s former deputy 
Afghani was assassinated, effectively silencing calls for checks on Godane’s power and 
moderation in Al-Shabaab’s hardline stances.240 With the elimination of his rivals and 
critics, Godane was able to dictate Al-Shabaab’s next moves with negligible opposition. 
The period post-withdrawal from Mogadishu proved to be another turning point in 
fostering the group’s reconsolidation: Al-Shabaab’s shift towards and reliance on guerrilla 
warfare tactics. While Godane’s initial call to retreat from Mogadishu indicated the Al-
Shabaab’s weakness and failure of military operations, the decision ultimately had the 
effect of regrouping Al-Shabaab forces and refocusing the jihadist efforts.241 Both Godane 
and the shura council agreed on the shift toward insurgency tactics rather than continuing 
the open warfare methods, exhibiting a strong unity of leadership.242  
In the final step of consolidating organizational cohesion, Godane worked to 
restructure Al-Shabaab to plan and execute operations more effectively while minimizing 
internal disputes and conflict.243 Godane accomplished this by decentralizing control of 
lower-level commanders while expanding the role and strengthening the authority of the 
 
237 Maruf and Joseph, Inside Al-Shabaab, 201. 
238 Maruf and Joseph, 201. 
239 Maruf and Joseph, 201. 
240 Maruf and Joseph, 206. 
241 Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 117. 
242 Hansen, 117. 
243 Horton, “Reclaiming Lost Ground in Somalia.” 
48 
Amniyat.244 This permitted ongoing monitoring and enforcement at all levels.245 
According to Horton, “Commanders and sub-commanders were empowered and allowed 
to recruit foot soldiers, appoint junior commanders and undertake limited defensive and 
offensive actions on their own initiative. They were also permitted to work with one 
another on joint operations, with little guidance from al-Shabaab’s governing body, the 
executive shura council.”246 This non-hierarchical structure empowered harmony among 
Somalia’s clans while ensuring Godane maintained a position as arbiter of inter-clan 
conflicts and ultimate control of the organization.247  
Godane further centralized Al-Shabaab’s strategic operations by reorganizing the 
group’s military wings to expand the group’s external focus.248 In 2013, Godane 
established a militant wing dedicated to attack planning against Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda, while another wing focused on operations against Ethiopia.249 With this renewed 
emphasis, Godane issued express orders to the Amniyat to accelerate external attack 
operations against neighboring countries.250  
In this leadership consolidation, Godane bolstered his allies, eliminated his 
challengers, and centralized control of the jihadist movement in Somalia.251 Under these 
conditions, Al-Shabaab moved forward with attack plans against the Westgate mall in 
Nairobi, Kenya.252 With the full support of Al-Shabaab leadership, Westgate attack 
planners coordinated all details for the attack, including multiple site assessments and the 
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finalized, Al-Shabaab’s external operations chief and Godane himself reviewed and 
approved the operation.254 While some organizational weaknesses remained, the Westgate 
attack cast Al-Shabaab back in the spotlight and reinvigorated the group’s unity, 
recruitment efforts, and dedication to their ultimate cause.255 Al-Shabaab’s dramatic shift 
from vocal internal dissenters liable to fracture the group to Al-Shabaab’s successful 
reconsolidation and highly coordinated attacks indicate the role of Al-Shabaab’s 
organization cohesion in the group’s resilience and provides support to the validity of 
Hypothesis 1.  
2. Power Mechanisms: Finance 
In the post-Ramadan offensive environment, Al-Shabaab took steps to decrease its 
expenditures while increasing its income to survive as an organization. Al-Shabaab made 
strategic cuts by delaying salaries among non-military and Amniyat members.256 By 
cutting in this area, Al-Shabaab could divert funds from the highly loyal Amniyat to 
counter its growing unpopularity among the Somali population and support its ongoing 
military campaign.257  
In 2011, Somalia faced widespread drought conditions, and Al-Shabaab maintained 
its refusal to allow international humanitarian agencies access to regions under its 
control.258 Instead, the group sought to provide indigenous humanitarian assistance, all of 
which required additional funding.259 To meet this added budgetary shortfall, Al-Shabaab 
increased zakat collection on small businesses and people living in public buildings while 
simultaneously implementing supplementary taxation measures namely, the collection of 
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‘infaaq,’ or ‘voluntary’ contribution from traders and clansmen, and the taxation of cargo 
on roadways within Al-Shabaab’s control.260 With the confiscation of infaaq, Al-Shabaab 
shifted from depicting itself the arbiter of Islamic law, with zakat’s religious basis, to 
outright predatory action.261 While predatory, this action was beneficial for Al-Shabaab’s 
resilience in that it enabled Al-Shabaab an increase in income necessary for the group’s 
survival. 
Al-Shabaab’s merger with Hizbul Islam provided another opportunity for new 
income streams: the acquisition of the pirate port of Haradere.262 Al-Shabaab began by 
occupying the city with 200 fighters and proceeded to enforce Al-Shabaab’s taxation 
methods on the piracy operations.263 Under threat of violence within Haradere and against 
the pirates’ relatives located elsewhere in Al-Shabaab-controlled regions, the pirates 
ultimately complied with a taxation rate of between 15% to 20%.264  
With the loss of Kismayo port city to the Kenyan army in fall 2012, Al-Shabaab 
again forfeited a significant income source as a smuggling point and taxation of imports 
and exports.265 Al-Shabaab responded by restoring connections with local businessmen 
and exploiting corruption among the Kenyan contingent in the region.266 Marchal and 
Sheikh describe Al-Shabaab’s pragmatism: “The corruption of all [Somali] regional state 
apparatuses is such that only the transaction costs are higher, but no door is actually 
closed.”267 By working with disparate factions, including government and criminal 
elements, Al-Shabaab displayed flexibility and adaptability in the changing circumstances 
post-Ramadan offensive.  
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Overall, Al-Shabaab’s ability to balance its income and expenditures and diversify 
its income streams when faced with setbacks or changing circumstances was a crucial 
factor in Al-Shabaab’s organizational resilience and provide additional support for 
Hypothesis 1. Al-Shabaab’s loss of the income-generating Mogadishu market and 
Kismayo port city meant the organization had far less ability to maintain and equip its 
fighters, let alone hold and govern territory effectively.268 Yet, under the catastrophic 
losses, Al-Shabaab successfully reprioritized its activities and restructured its organization 
for long-term survival.269  
3. Power Mechanisms: Intelligence 
In the period post-2010 offensive, the Amniyat’s role and influence both 
strengthened and expanded within Al-Shabaab’s organization. After Al-Shabaab withdrew 
from Mogadishu and lost significant income streams, the group shifted to lower risk 
operations which prioritized operational security, all of which relied on the Amniyat’s 
expertise.270 As AMISOM pushed Al-Shabaab fighters out of urban areas, Amniyat 
operatives stayed behind and established an extensive network of informants that collected 
and fed information back to Al-Shabaab leadership.271  
Internal to Al-Shabaab’s organization, the Amniyat remained Godane’s personal 
enforcement instrument.272 The Amniyat command structure fell outside of Al-Shabaab’s 
shura council authority, allowing Godane to use the network to target his internal 
adversaries relatively unchecked, as he had done during the Ramadan offensive.273 
According to Horton, even as Godane decentralized much of Al-Shabaab’s organization, 
the Amniyat became more centralized and powerful in imposing Godane’s will: “Amniyat 
operatives — who were and are seeded throughout the larger Al-Shabaab organization — 
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ensured the loyalty and discipline of regional and sub-commanders. Disloyalty to Godane, 
financial irregularities and ideological deviations could all lead to harsh punishments that 
included summary execution.”274  
The loyalty of the Amniyat served as Godane’s enforcement mechanism in the face 
of mounting internal fragmentation and fomented group cohesion through fear of torture 
and execution of dissidents.275 The Amniyat’s success in providing timely and accurate 
information for Al-Shabaab’s leadership decisions, while reliably enforcing Godane’s 
decrees served as an influential factor in Al-Shabaab’s rebound. This section offers support 
for Hypothesis 1 as Al-Shabaab’s organizational attribute and power mechanism of its 
highly effective intelligence apparatus were essential to the group’s resilience. 
C. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 2: POLITICAL CONTEXT 
1. Somalia’s Failed State Context 
In the years before the Ramadan offensive, Al-Shabaab approached Somalia’s 
failed state environment as an opportunity to establish a new system of order based in 
sharia.276 As Petrich explains, “The group positioned itself as a justice provider and 
constructed a narrative of law and order provision for communities under its control, 
reducing street level violence and establishing mechanisms of justice in the absence of the 
legitimate government’s ability to do so.”277 Al-Shabaab built administrative processes 
while incorporating clan sensitivities and minimizing internal corruption earning the 
organization respect and legitimacy in the eyes of the Somali public.278  
Al-Shabaab accomplished this through a sustained commitment to consistent 
governance functions and neutrality in the face of Somalia’s clannism.279 According to 
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Marchal, Al-Shabaab’s troops focused on following orders and keeping their distance from 
the Somali population.280 This allows the group to maintain its position of authority and 
distinct from the civilian population. Finally, Al-Shabaab offers a semblance of order and 
discipline, which is largely absent in the Somali government entities.281 Marchal claims, 
“Working this way has an impact on foreigners and diaspora since it reinforces the 
credibility of Al-Shabaab and, therefore, the need to support it and endorse its political 
agenda overseas.”282 Al-Shabaab’s competency in the void of Somali governance gave the 
group leverage over the population.283 
With the onset of the Ramadan offensive, Al-Shabaab’s ability to follow through 
with its governance commitments became severely deficient. Al-Shabaab faced military 
defeat and significant financial loss, but 2011 also brought a devastating drought-induced 
famine to Somalia.284 Al-Shabaab’s response to the drought exacerbated an already dire 
situation as the group forbade any international humanitarian aid agencies from entering 
areas it controlled.285 This decision fueled growing resentment among the Somali 
population and contributing to Al-Shabaab’s internal organizational conflict.286 The 
internal conflict fell along clan lines as Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher, and Sheehan report, 
“Godane, a member of the Isaaq tribe based in Somaliland, which was hardly affected by 
the famine, publically refused Western aid while members of Robow’s Rahanweyn clan 
were starving and dying. Robow’s request to accept the aid was ignored, and is likely to 
have further accentuated tensions with Godane.”287 Al-Shabaab’s inability to provide for 
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the people’s basic needs while refusing foreign aid provoked a significant setback in the 
group’s popularity, legitimacy, and strength.288 
Al-Shabaab’s dramatic low point in popular standing was marked with violent 
public demonstrations in which some affiliated elders and youths were killed within Al-
Shabaab’s territory.289 According to Marchal, Godane reacted to this crisis by making a 
persuasive speech in which he expressed his priorities namely, “the militias should not 
overreact, education is better than punishment; the regional governors, the Amiir wilaaya, 
are responsible if things go wrong; public good and properties should be respected by 
everyone.” 290 By acknowledging the Somali’s legitimate grievances and outlining a plan 
to remedy the situation, Godane opened the door to win back public support. 
In the post-Ramadan offensive recovery, Godane backed up his words with action 
as he transferred ineffectual regional leaders to other positions within Al-Shabaab.291 Al-
Shabaab also made public goods and services a priority, especially with the appointment 
of a regional healthcare coordinator.292 In areas of Al-Shabaab’s control, the group 
established a transactional relationship with local nongovernmental healthcare 
organizations to respond to specific medical emergencies.293 In making these concessions, 
Al-Shabaab recognized that the organization required public support to function and 
understood that providing social services was a more effective means of gaining that 
support rather than solely coercive techniques.294 Al-Shabaab’s ability to fill the void in 
the absence of Somali government goods and services allowed the group to retain 
legitimacy during a period of extreme crisis. This ultimately served as a critical factor in 
Al-Shabaab’s organizational resilience and supports the validity of Hypothesis 2. 
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2. Kenya as a Target of Opportunity 
Al-Shabaab maintained its historically antagonistic relationship with Kenya in the 
years leading to the group’s failure of the Ramadan offensive. As the Kenyan government 
allied with the West in the counterterrorism fight against the group, Al-Shabaab held a 
vested interest not only on combating Kenya in Somalia but also supported the affiliated 
Al-Hijra network in Kenya.295 Although the extent of Al-Shabaab’s direct control over Al-
Hijra varies, the two groups keep close ties, especially among Kenya’s extensive Somali 
diaspora population.296 
Prior to the Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive, Al-Hijra members coordinated with 
Al-Shabaab for the 2010 Kampala, Uganda World Cup attacks; however, their activities in 
Kenya were much smaller scale at the time.297 While Al-Shabaab intended to conduct 
large-scale external attacks, especially against AMISOM members like Kenya, the group 
had yet to fulfill the full extent of its goal.298 
The Ramadan offensive’s failure presented a significant setback in Al-Shabaab’s 
plans. Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from Somali urban centers and move toward guerrilla 
tactics put the group on the defensive and struggling on the brink of military defeat.299 As 
Al-Shabaab regrouped, its focus on external attacks lessened while the group prioritized 
safe havens to continue its covert activity.300 Many analysts assessed Nairobi was one such 
enclave where Al-Shabaab continued its logistical and financial operations undetected, 
according to Menkhaus, as quoted by Gettleman and Kulish.301 
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Following Al-Shabaab’s 2010 failure, the organization’s relationship with the 
Kenyan government deteriorated further as the Kenya played a major role in military 
operations in Somalia.302 Kenya’s military surge in Somalia in 2011, known as Operation 
Linda Nchi, established a buffer zone in southern Somalia and hit Al-Shabaab 
strongholds.303 While hurting Al-Shabaab militarily, Kenya’s operations offered Al-
Shabaab the pretext of retaliation for “bombing innocent people” in Somalia.304 
Throughout this phase, Al-Shabaab continued to encourage lone-wolf style attacks, 
mainly small-scale grenade attacks, against the abundance of soft targets such as hotels, 
restaurants, and shopping malls in Kenya.305 However, the presence, sympathy, and 
loyalty of the Al-Hijra network combined with weaknesses in Kenya’s security sector, all 
made Kenya an attractive target for a large-scale attack.306 
The attack on Kenya’s Westgate mall via the Al-Hijra network proved to be a 
triumphant success for Al-Shabaab, which detracted from its significant military defeats 
and internal conflicts in Somalia.307 Godane’s ruthless decision to massacre civilians 
garnered worldwide media coverage and strategic gains in propaganda and recruitment 
opportunities for the group.308 Kenya proved to be a target of opportunity that paid 
dividends and set Al-Shabaab on the course for a rebound. 
The Westgate attack proved to be one of Al-Shabaab’s most successful operations. 
The scale and scope of the atrocities provided Al-Shabaab extensive media coverage, 
boosting its image as a formidable terrorist organization while significantly discrediting 
Kenya’s security response.309 Al-Shabaab’s ability to plan and conduct attacks within 
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Kenya offers support for the role of political context in Al-Shabaab’s resilience and 
provides evidence for Hypothesis 2’s validity. 
D. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 3: FAILED COUNTERTERRORISM 
1. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia’s Policies and Impact 
In the years leading up to the Ramadan offensive in 2010, the TFG was found to be 
one of the most corrupt governments in the world, so much so that despite Somalia’s grave 
humanitarian needs, most international aid agencies preferred to work around the 
government.310 While external donor agencies pursued initiatives to revive Somalia’s 
central government capacity, the rampant insecurity throughout the country made funding 
accountability a nearly insurmountable challenge.311 Although Al-Shabaab remained an 
ongoing concern, the TFG found that externally supported institution-building projects 
became lucrative.312 In the interim, however, the TFG continued to lack of capacity to 
confront the challenge of Al-Shabaab.  
During the Ramadan offensive, the TFG’s performance did little to build credibility 
among Somalis or the international community. Frequent reports of TFG army looting or 
deserting combined with recurrent incidences of TFG leadership’s overreliance on foreign 
intermediaries and deferment of violent operations to AMISOM, hurt any possible 
reputation boost the government may have received from the victory of Al-Shabaab’s 
withdrawal.313 According to Menkhaus, “After seven years in existence, the TFG was still 
unable to exercise control over most of the capital Mogadishu, had failed to advance key 
transitional tasks, and had almost no functional civil service. The one critical moment when 
it had a chance to demonstrate some basic capacity and commitment to provide life-saving 
aid to its citizens—the terrible famine of 2011, in which 260,000 Somalis died and over a 
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million were displaced—the TFG failed utterly.”314 These public failures degraded the 
TFG’s already dismal standing domestically and among its international partners. 
In the aftermath of the Ramadan offensive, the TFG initially implemented reforms 
to address some of its internal challenges. Marchal explains the nature of these reforms, 
“The decision taken by the TFG President to fire key military and intelligence officials 
early March 2011 is said to have been provoked by two overlapping reasons. The first one 
is that most of them were supporters of the Speaker and could claim their share in what 
appeared as a victory against Shabaab. The second is that some were allegedly suspected 
to cooperate with al-Shabaab either for clan reasons or money.”315 While somewhat 
superficial, these reforms indicated a desire for positive change within Somalia’s 
government. 
In August 2012, the TFG transitioned to the internationally recognized Federal 
Government of Somalia (FGS), and with the new centralized government, hopes were high 
of continued improvements in credibility and legitimacy.316 Unfortunately, the vision did 
not come to fruition as the government continued to lack the capability to fill the basic 
needs of its citizens.317 Instead, international non-governmental agencies manage Somali 
schools and hospitals and other members of the private sector support all remaining goods 
and services.318 
In the fight against Al-Shabaab, the FGS’s record sustained the TFG’s 
shortcomings. Issues of missed payments or only occasional salaries to FGS soldiers and 
police force created problems of poor performance, discipline, and corruption.319 
Recurrent reports of Somali government forces selling weapons and ammunition to 
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members of Al-Shabaab hurt the FGS militarily and fomented a credibility setback among 
the Somali populous.320 The persistent failings of the Somali government served as a 
valuable opportunity for Al-Shabaab exploitation and revival and indicates Hypothesis 3 
is valid. 
2. AMISOM’s Policies and Impact 
Since 2006, the international community, including the coalition of AMISOM, 
ramped up its involvement in Somali counterterrorism efforts.321 Al-Shabaab’s 2010 
Kampala attacks catalyzed troop increases among African Union members and a renewed 
commitment to defeating the violent extremist organization.322 From 2010 onward, 
AMISOM transitioned from purely defense and training focused to offensive operations 
targeting Al-Shabaab and bringing security to Somalia Mogadishu.323 
In the face of Al-Shabaab’s Ramadan offensive failure, AMISOM performed well 
militarily but confronted challenges in strategizing its public messaging.324 AMISOM’s 
public policy made several missteps that eroded trust with Somali civilians, specifically the 
decision to misstate the number of AMISOM casualties.325 According to Marchal, “The 
AMISOM media policy, by denying high losses, can be understood, but its impact on 
Somali perceptions of the situation may become quickly counterproductive: if all major 
actors are playing propaganda, then nothing is true. Lies and conspiracy theories may sort 
out Al-Shabaab problems more than AMISOM’s.”326 While AMISOM’s strong offensive 
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successfully pushed Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu, their ability to safeguard security 
within the city depended on popular support and compliance, primarily due to Al-
Shabaab’s return to guerrilla warfare tactics.327 
In the period post-Ramadan offensive, AMISOM proceeded with the military 
victories of nominally pushing Al-Shabaab from urban areas but struggled with the local 
public perception of its operations.328 With limited and often ineffective Somali 
government involvement in reestablishing control, the military operations appeared as a 
foreign occupation and fed Al-Shabaab’s recruitment narrative.329 Kenya’s 2011 
intervention into Somalia added a clan dimension to the problem of AMISOM’s 
appearance as foreign interference.330 Kenya’s reliance on the Ogadeen clan and allies to 
conduct its operations into Somalia meant that opposing clans were more susceptible to 
Al-Shabaab recruitment out of clan solidarity.331 As a result of these added complications 
and the unsuccessful Somali political process to support AMISOM’s gains, Al-Shabaab 
ultimately gained sympathies and recruitment opportunities among the Somali 
population.332 The ineffective policies of AMISOM and the lack of legitimacy within 
Somalia indicate a failure in the overall counterterrorism policy to successfully prevent Al-
Shabaab’s resurgence and provides support for Hypothesis 3. 
3. United States’ Policies and Impact 
The United States remained a strong supporter of counterterrorism efforts against 
Al-Shabaab in the years leading up to the group’s failed Ramadan offensive. Due to Al-
Shabaab’s association with Al-Qaeda, the U.S. provided both financial aid and training to 
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AMISOM and other troop-contributing countries.333 The U.S. recognized the substantial 
threat that Al-Shabaab posed in the region.334 According to Ploch Blanchard, “The United 
States has implemented a variety of foreign assistance and security cooperation programs 
to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa. These programs seek to build partner 
countries’ intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen 
aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter 
recruitment.”335 To maintain stability in the region, these programs were aimed at 
improving partner capabilities while targeting terrorist elements. 
In March 2008, the United States Secretary of State formally designated the militant 
group Al-Shabaab a Foreign Terrorist Organization.336 This meant this group would be 
prohibited from receiving financial or material support, and any known members would 
have property or interests in the United States blocked.337 The United States Executive 
Order 13224 specified the importance of confronting and eradicating the financial support 
network for terrorist organizations including Al-Shabaab by, “authorizing the United States 
government to designate and block the assets of foreign individuals and entities that 
commit, or pose a significant risk of committing, acts of terrorism.” 338 In addition, the 
Order authorized the United States government to take the same measures against “entities 
that provide support, services, assistance to, or otherwise associate with” know terrorist 
organizations.339 
The United States performed several military activities prior to the 2010 Ramadan 
offensive. Notably, the United States provided support in the form of a drone surveillance 
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program with occasional combat operations against Somali targets.340 According to 
Zenko, as quoted by Woods, these strikes “were not about shaping Somalia but about going 
after particular individuals tied to specific terrorist plots, who happened to be there.”341  
The onset of the 2010 Ramadan offensive brought an increase in the number and 
types of strikes supported by the United States. In the spring of 2011, while AMISOM 
pressed forward with its offensive operations, the United States targeted Al-Shabaab 
directly as the group was perceived to be a direct threat to U.S. interests.342 Multiple drone 
strikes on militant camps killed Al-Shabaab commanders while wounding others in a 
coordinated effort to eradicate the group.343 Also, the United States maintained its security 
cooperation and expanded its partnership capacity-building programs to support AMISOM 
and the TFG during the Ramadan offensive.344 
In the aftermath of the 2010 Ramadan offensive, the United States sustained its 
kinetic operations and placed significant pressure on Al-Shabaab’s operational, financial, 
and political efforts in order to decrease the organization’s ability to destabilize East 
Africa.345 The White House spokesman Carney summarized U.S. regional 
counterterrorism activities: “We are harnessing every tool of American power – military, 
civilian, and diplomatic. The United States is strengthening its intelligence, military and 
security capabilities and drawing from a full range of law enforcement tools in coordination 
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with partners around the globe.”346 With this whole-of-government approach, the U.S. 
sought to support AMISOM in their fight against Al-Shabaab while conducting limited 
strikes on terrorist entities who posed a direct threat to the United States.347  
In early 2013, the United States formally recognized the Federal Government of 
Somalia (FGS) and began providing tentative support directly to the new government to 
support their security and political development.348 This support remained limited as the 
FGS faced challenges in effectively utilizing the training and funding provided.349 
Unfortunately, the United States’ limited engagement with the group did little to deter Al-
Shabaab and its regional sympathizers from successfully conducting the Westgate mall 
attack. The U.S. counterterrorism policy failed to prevent Al-Shabaab’s internal 
reconsolidation, its financial diversification, its ability to attain legitimacy among the 
Somali people, and its exploitation of Kenya as a target of opportunity—all evidence 
supporting the validity of Hypothesis 3 and the role of the failed counterterrorism policies.  
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IV. CASE STUDY 2: THE DEATH OF EMIR GODANE 
The second Case Study will review the events leading up to Al-Shabaab’s potential 
destruction after the loss of the group’s emir Ahmed Godane in a U.S. airstrike and the 
organizational rebound that followed. The first section will provide a summary of critical 
events and Al-Shabaab’s response to these event. This section will be followed by the 
application of Hypothesis 1: Organizational Attribute, Hypothesis 2: Political Context, 
and Hypothesis 3: Failed Counterterrorism approaches, respectively. In Case Study 2, 
Al-Shabaab’s organizational decapitation, or loss of its emir Godane, will be considered 
the group’s ‘shock.’ The major attack conducted on Garissa University, Kenya, in spring 
2015 will be considered the group’s successful rebound point. Each hypothesis will 
evaluate the impact of the shock, and the factors that enabled the group to rebound. Finally, 
this case study will again consider Al-Shabaab’s critical variables for resiliency as assessed 
from each approach. 
A. SUMMARY OF MAJOR EVENTS 
The impact of Godane’s death on Al-Shabaab as an organization remained closely 
linked to Godane’s leadership legacy. In the years leading up to his death, Godane held a 
mixed record of successes while his executive management remained wrought with internal 
conflict.350 According to Anzalone, “During his tenure, al-Shabab reached the height of 
its territorial, administrative, economic, and military power. It was also under his 
leadership; however, that al-Shabab fell into decline, losing great swaths of territory and 
most major urban centers and economic hubs, and earning the displeasure of Usama bin 
Ladin.”351  
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In one area of success, Godane greatly expanded joint coordination among Al-
Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, Al-Hijra.352 In targeting Kenya, Godane positioned Al-
Shabaab’s strategy to focus on cross-border attacks and further infiltrating the 
disenfranchised Kenyan-Somali diaspora .353 The majority of Al-Shabaab’s cross border 
attacks into Kenya remained small-scale landmine, IED, or grenade attacks, while the 
group retained safe havens in Somalia to plan and coordinate major operations.354 Within 
Kenya, Al-Hijra drew support from Nairobi’s more impoverished neighborhoods, Somali-
Kenyan border towns, and coastal regions populated with sympathetic ethnic Somalis, 
which Al-Shabaab leveraged for ideological influence and jihadist inspiration.355 
However within Somalia, Al-Shabaab suffered near-constant internal discord, 
which Godane sought to remedy by eliminating rivals and more moderate members 
through various purges during his time in power.356 Godane found it essential to use the 
Amniyat as a “praetorian guard” within Al-Shabaab to warn him of threats, eliminate his 
rivals, and exact his will.357 While highly effective for Godane, the personalized power 
structure left Al-Shabaab highly vulnerable to internal breakdown with the change in 
leadership to Diiriye’s command. Also, Godane’s internal coups and hardline approach to 
dissent in the years leading up to his death depleted the group of potential membership, 
leaving the organization vulnerable to AMISOM and the Somali government’s 
advances.358  
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The period leading up to Al-Shabaab’s near destruction with Godane’s death in 
2014 arrived as a compilation of setbacks. Militarily, AMISOM and the government of 
Somalia pursued an offensive to eliminate the group’s top leadership and attack the Al-
Shabaab’s financial mechanisms.359 The immense pressure sparked large numbers of 
defectors from Al-Shabaab’s ranks as it lost control of territory to AMISOM and the 
FGS.360 Maruf and Joseph describe the state of Al-Shabaab at the near the time of 
Godane’s death, “The last few months of Godane’s rule had been something of a disaster 
for the group. None of Al-Shabaab’s 2014 attacks had even a fraction of the impact of the 
Westgate mall assault, and on the military front, the group was losing ground almost by 
the day.”361 Al-Shabaab’s military and economic losses fed its increasing internal 
instability, a trend that was only compounded by the loss of Godane’s charismatic 
leadership.362 
On September 1, 2014, with the cooperation of the government of Somalia, the 
United States conducted a precision airstrike, which resulted in Al-Shabaab emir Ahmed 
Godane’s death.363 The targeted killing was thought to be a tremendous victory for the 
U.S., AMISOM, and Somalia in that it was both a symbolic blow to the group’s 
invincibility and an operational loss that would severely weaken the group’s strike 
capability.364 After Godane’s death, the government of Somalia announced the 
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inevitability of Al-Shabaab’s imminent collapse and offered amnesty to those fighters who 
would renounce their ties to the group.365 
The crushing blow of Godane’s death jolted Al-Shabaab’s internal dynamics, 
already prone to factionalism and power struggles over control of resources, territory, and 
military strategy.366 According to Maruf and Joseph, “Al-Shabaab’s situation was like that 
of a country that has suddenly lost a military dictator or president-for-life. Not only was 
there not a succession plan, but the chances of a power struggle were very real given the 
high stakes, the egos of the potential heirs, and the fact that all those present were 
comfortable with the use of violence.”367 When faced with appointing Godane’s successor, 
ensuring universal acceptance of the new emir, and rejuvenating the group’s military 
prowess under new leadership, Al-Shabaab appeared incapable of uniting to overcome the 
challenges and instead seemed doomed for implosion.  
By April 2015, Al-Shabaab conducted its most notorious attack since the Westgate 
mall siege when gunmen massacred 148 students and injured an additional 79 in Garissa 
University, Kenya.368 In Al-Shabaab’s subsequent media statement claiming 
responsibility for the attack, the group blamed the Kenyan government for committing 
atrocities against Muslims.369 It threatened further violence in retaliation for occupying 
Muslim territory: “Do not dream of security in your lands until security becomes a reality 
in the Muslims lands, including the North Eastern Province and the Coast and until all your 
forces withdraw from all Muslim lands.”370 With the widespread publicity and by framing 
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the attack in terms of Muslim oppression, Al-Shabaab garnered hundreds of new recruits 
to join the jihadist cause throughout the Kenyan region of Isiolo.371 
In the period that followed, Al-Shabaab further demonstrated its organizational 
strength and resilience by going on the offensive back in Somalia.372 By this time, Al-
Shabaab’s core strategy involved targeting both civilians, including government officials, 
businessmen, and diplomats in Mogadishu while also conducting “blitzkrieg-like assaults” 
on AMISOM forward operating bases.373 No longer considered a terrorist organization on 
the brink of destruction, as Maruf and Joseph describe, Al-Shabaab’s rebound again posed 
a significant transnational threat: “What was clear was that under [new] leadership, the 
group had found ways to rejuvenate itself without losing its identity. In business terms, he 
and other Shabaab leaders could be said to have “revitalized the brand.”374 
Like the extreme low point in 2010, Al-Shabaab faced a similar crossroads in the 
organization’s survival and success in the period post-Godane’s death in 2014. The loss of 
the highly influential commander placed Al-Shabaab in a vulnerable position with potential 
leadership infighting and weakened strategic vision. However, Al-Shabaab again proved 
capable of a violent resurgence. With the culmination of the Garissa University attack, Al-
Shabaab demonstrated its resilience by shocking the world with its level of violence and 
sophistication. Al-Shabaab’s subsequent offensive within Somalia provided the necessary 
evidence to confirm the group’s full recovery. The following sections will explore how Al-
Shabaab once more became a substantial threat to the region’s stability and security. 
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B. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 1: ORGANIZATIONAL ATTRIBUTES 
1. Organizational Cohesion 
In the wake of Godane’s elimination, the vacuum left by the former emir heightened 
the urgency for critical Al-Shabaab leadership to reach a consensus on Godane’s successor 
and pledge the same fidelity and allegiance to the new emir for the organization to 
survive.375 Al-Shabaab’s executive council managed to surmount this critical obstacle, 
starting with their approach to Godane’s eulogy. In their public statement, Al-Shabaab 
leadership announced Godane’s martyrdom while calling upon both Somali clans and 
Kenyan Muslims to reaffirm their support.376 By idolizing the death of the emir, Al-
Shabaab leaders glorified the notion of fighting to the death as a means of demonstrating 
unquestioning commitment and legitimizing the cause to the group’s followers.377 
In addition to this unified announcement of Godane’s martyrdom, Al-Shabaab’s 
executive council agreed to Ahmed Diiriye within one week of Godane’s death.378 
Although Al-Shabaab lacked an official succession plan, Godane had declared his wishes 
for Ahmed Diiriye to replace him while still alive.379 Diiriye was a Somali who had 
previously been a member of al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI), Al-Shabaab’s predecessor, and 
had risen the ranks to serve as a senior member of Al-Shabaab.380 This experience gave 
Diiriye the credibility and internal support required to be a serious contender for Godane’s 
replacement, and by early September 2014, the council officially named Diiriye as Al-
Shabaab’s new emir.381  
As a protégé of Godane, Diiriye maintained a similar outlook regarding the 
government of Somalia and loyal relations with Al-Qaeda, but he held less experience as a 
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jihadist and weaker clan ties.382 These characteristics left Diiriye a less controversial figure 
than his predecessor, but also more vulnerable to challengers within Al-Shabaab’s lower 
ranks. For this reason, while Diiriye kept the majority of the upper echelons of Al-Shabaab 
consistent, one of his initial leadership actions included replacing lower-level commanders 
in key positions with trusted individuals, and then allowing for more autonomy among 
these leaders.383  
In his immediate actions as emir, Diiriye understood the need to foment consensus 
among Al-Shabaab’s internal dissenters and refocus the group to conduct violent 
operations. One of Diiriye’s first acts included creating rehabilitation programs for former 
Al-Shabaab commanders who had been jailed for mutiny or dissent.384 He planned to 
transform these critics and disaffected Al-Shabaab members into fully-fledged, active 
members once again.385 This process enabled Al-Shabaab to increase solidarity among its 
membership, resulting in minimized public discord within the organization. Diiriye then 
redirected the group’s efforts towards internal Somali attacks and external attack operations 
in the wider East African region.386  
Diiriye’s more conciliatory and consensus-based leadership style paired with his 
decision to decentralize Al-Shabaab’s command structure enhanced cohesion within the 
organization.387 According to Bryden, Diiriye’s emphasis on decentralization within Al-
Shabaab produced a “larger number of autonomous sub-groups. Diiriye’s continued 
leadership and the effectiveness of his forces are thus more than ever in the hands of Al-
Shabaab’s junior leaders and rank and file, rather than its ‘Amir’ and putative leadership 
council, or ‘Shura’.”388 The benefit of this organizational structure meant that tactical 
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defeat or losses in one sector of Al-Shabaab had little impact on the organization’s 
successful operations or regional presence elsewhere.389  
Al-Shabaab’s sustained attacks within Somalia and its emphasis on external 
operations further unified the group to a common purpose while minimizing internal 
skirmishes.390 With Diiriye’s strategy for specific attack planning within Kenya, the emir 
was able to streamline the group’s organizational structure with lethal consequences.391 
Through more effective use of manpower and responsive lower-level commanders, Al-
Shabaab ramped up small scale attacks throughout the region, culminating with the 
devastating attack on Garissa University.392 Instead of organizational weakness and 
disintegration, Al-Shabaab united in deciding upon a successor and ramped up the lethality 
of its operations against AMISOM, civilian targets in Somalia and throughout the 
region.393 This strong show of organizational cohesion throughout this period of crisis 
indicates the validity of Hypothesis 1. 
2. Power Mechanisms: Finance 
The expected impact of Godane’s death on Al-Shabaab’s financial mechanisms was 
far more detrimental than the reality of what occurred.394 Operationally, Al-Shabaab was 
viewed as capable of financing and carrying out attacks as the group’s financial 
mechanisms were unhindered by Godane’s death, however psychologically, analysts 
expected Al-Shabaab to experience significant challenges.395 The elimination of Al-
Shabaab’s authoritarian emir led many to believe the organization would fragment along 
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clan lines, with lower-level leaders claiming personalized control of taxation systems and 
economic resources.396  
Diiriye’s ability to consolidate control and foment solidarity among the group’s 
upper echelon and regional leaders provided a minimal interruption in Al-Shabaab’s 
financial income streams and successful military operations.397 Within Mogadishu and 
other strategic towns nominally under government control, Al-Shabaab exploited the 
constant insecurity by providing protection in exchange for taxation payments.398 Outside 
the urban areas, Al-Shabaab’s well-established taxation collection at roadside checkpoints 
and opportunistic use of smuggling allowed the group diversified income streams to 
respond to changing conditions or potential crises.399 Al-Shabaab’s highly effective 
financial mechanisms allowed the group to function regardless of its ability to administer 
the territory physically. 
To ensure uninterrupted income streams during the crisis period, Al-Shabaab 
tailored its messaging for specific audiences. Al-Shabaab exploited Godane’s martyrdom 
to leverage financial support and remittances from the Somali diaspora and Muslim 
communities worldwide with its “Islam versus the West” messaging.400 Within Somalia, 
it focused on more nationalistic grievances to acquire financial resources in the wake of 
Godane’s death.401 Road tax collection, smuggling, and taxation of businesses for 
protection continued to pay for its insurgency expenses, including weapon acquisitions and 
bribery for government officials.402 Al-Shabaab’s flexibility and adaptability in adjusting 
the means and methods of funding for organizational survival provide additional evidence 
for Hypothesis 1. 
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3. Power Mechanisms: Intelligence 
With Godane’s death, the initial unknowns regarding the Amniyat’s loyalty 
resembled much of the organization’s fragility. Al-Shabaab’s organizational survival 
depended heavily upon the Amniyat network to provide vital intelligence on targets of 
economic and military interest.403 While Godane had expressed his desire for Diiriye as 
his successor and Diiriye had previously served in a supervisory role within the Amniyat, 
it remained uncertain whether the secretive and powerful unit would maintain allegiance 
to the new emir.404 
One of Diiriye’s first personnel decisions as emir included preserving the much of 
the Amniyat’s hierarchical command structure and retaining the Amniyat’s commander, 
Karate.405 This pragmatic choice, combined with Diiriye’s directives to increase attacks 
against AMISOM and FGS forces, effectively prevented internal tensions and focused the 
Amniyat on retaliatory operations.406 Under Diiriye’s leadership, Al-Shabaab’s attacks 
evolved in both the tactics used and targets selected within Somalia. According to Shire, 
there is evidence that Al-Shabaab’s leadership decapitation resulted in increased attack 
potency, “[Godane’s] killing spurred a massive wave of retaliatory responses, the majority 
of them being single suicide attacks – an increase of 84.2% compared to the period before 
the killing – and a slight increase in multiple suicide operations (16.6%).”407 The shift 
towards single suicide operations allowed Al-Shabaab to exact quick revenge and 
demonstrate resilience without the Amniyat’s need for extensive coordination and 
resources to conduct sophisticated, multiple suicide attacks.408 
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In addition to these tactical shifts, Al-Shabaab also adjusted its target selection 
within Somalia. Post-Godane’s death, Al-Shabaab increased the number of single-suicide 
attacks against civilians while retaining the majority of its attacks against military targets, 
including AMISOM and Somali National Army forward operating bases.409 With its more 
complicated, multiple-suicide operations, Al-Shabaab primarily targeted civilians with the 
majority of its attacks aimed at hotels.410 Al-Shabaab’s spokesman Ali Dheere explained 
Al-Shabaab’s rationale by claiming the group specifically targeted hotels frequented by 
government officials and intelligence agents, and that these attacks were intended to deter 
civilian spies.411 The measurable uptick in attacks on civilian and military targets acted as 
an expression of immediate revenge for Godane’s death while efficiently directing the 
Amniyat’s capabilities against external adversaries.412 
Outside of Somalia, the Amniyat ramped up its operational tempo by planning and 
conducting attacks in the surrounding region.413 The autumn of 2014 saw two major Al-
Shabaab attack plans foiled in both the Ugandan and Ethiopian capitals.414 While the 
national security services in both countries were able to disrupt the attacks, Al-Shabaab 
demonstrated its resolve to target AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries and the firm 
dedication to its cause despite its new leadership.415 Yet of all Somalia’s neighboring 
countries, Kenya remained Al-Shabaab’s most attractive target for external attack and a 
major focus for the Amniyat. 
The expansion of the Amniyat’s mission set and diversification of intelligence 
sources in Kenya further allowed the group to rebound. Petrich and Donnelly describe Al-
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Shabaab’s recruitment techniques through social media and in-person pitches as targeting 
a more comprehensive range of individuals of both genders, with expanded intelligence 
collection roles for women.416 According to the authors, “In Nairobi, al-Shabaab has 
recognized the potential of an existing but untapped way to use women to advance their 
cause: sex workers as contractor-spies…Al-Shabaab had subcontracted some local sex 
workers as intelligence officers, paying them for information disclosed by their 
customers.”417 This innovative development allowed the Amniyat greater access to 
government and security sector personnel to identify vulnerabilities for more successful 
attacks. 
With the attack at Garissa University, Al-Shabaab received powerful international 
publicity that enabled the redoubling of the Amniyat’s recruitment efforts and targeted 
intimidation of Somali government members.418 According to Yusuf, in the aftermath of 
the Garissa attack, the Amniyat actively targeted youths as recruits, “A vast network of 
influencers and recruitment agents freely roam around town, identifying idle youth who 
are their immediate targets. Once the identified youths have been lured to join the jihadist 
movement, another team takes over. At least 200 boys are missing from schools within 
Isiolo and their whereabouts remain unknown.”419 Also, within Somalia, the Amniyat 
ramped up its attacks against diplomats, businessmen, and government officials through its 
strategy of intimidation and constant insecurity.420 These factors indicated the power and 
efficacy of the Amniyat fully recovered from the instability and vulnerability of Godane’s 
death and contributed to Al-Shabaab’s potent resilience as an organization in accordance 
with Hypothesis 1. 
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C. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 2: POLITICAL CONTEXT 
1. Somalia’s Failed State Context 
With the death of Godane, Al-Shabaab lost a highly detailed manager and a uniting 
force within the group’s structure, all severely challenging its ability to provide goods and 
services throughout Somalia.421 Al-Shabaab’s rebound depended upon the successor’s 
leadership competence in managing the organization’s diverse array of services, 
operations, and public relations. At this crucial moment, any managerial misstep or outcry 
of internal dissidents within Al-Shabaab’s organization could severely hinder the provision 
of goods and services, thereby weakening the organization’s power and influence among 
the Somali people and throughout the Horn of Africa.422 
Diiriye’s appointment and subsequent takeover as emir proved a critical factor in 
Al-Shabaab’s renewal as he maintained continuity with Godane’s previous strategic 
vision.423 Bryden characterizes Diiriye’s continued emphasis on decentralized control to 
provide essential services throughout Somalia as “local leaders and commanders plan and 
conduct operations, raise revenues and – where Al-Shabaab still controls territory – 
administer populations under their control.”424 Al-Shabaab’s continued commitment to 
providing goods and services in the absence of competent FGS institutions fostered the 
grassroots support needed to ramp up retaliatory jihadist operations. 
In taking command, Diiriye understood the need for Al-Shabaab to remain a 
legitimate actor within the East Africa region to govern effectively in the absence of state 
apparatus.425 Despite conducting attacks that often hit civilians, Shire notes, “Al-Shabaab 
recalculating the cost-benefit balance of conducting further suicide operations and its 
avoidance of civilian spaces as potential targets, with the exception of heavily guarded 
 
421 Anzalone, “The Life and Death of Al-Shabab Leader Ahmed Godane.” 
422 Anzalone. 
423 Bryden, “The Decline and Fall of Al-Shabaab? Think Again.” 
424 Bryden. 
425 Shire, “How Do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings?,” 16. 
78 
hotels frequented by government officials and foreign visitors.”426 In this way, Al-Shabaab 
attempted to shape the Somali popular sentiment by framing attacks as targeting foreigners 
and non-Muslims, while continuing to provide essential services in areas of control.427 
Nowhere was this methodology more apparent than in the attack on Garissa University as 
Al-Shabaab militants specifically targeted non-Muslims for death on the spot, while 
sparing those who ascribed to Islam, all in the name of “liberation of Muslims lands.”428 
Al-Shabaab’s exploitation of Somalia’s failed state and disenfranchised populations 
indicate the validity of Hypothesis 2. 
2. Kenya as a Target of Opportunity 
Despite the expectation that Godane’s death would bring fragmentation and 
disarray among Al-Shabaab and its affiliate Al-Hijra, the organization’s operations tempo 
remained largely unhindered.429 According to Maruf and Joseph, one of Diiriye’s first 
actions as emir dictated further attacks against Kenya: “Under the new management, 
Shabaab also increased its attacks on Kenyan soil and areas along the Kenya-Somalia 
border. Besides striking back at the Kenyans, the strategy had two apparent goals—
winning new jihadist recruits through high-profile attacks and inflaming relations between 
the country’s Muslim and Christian communities.”430 The goal of inciting a religious-
fueled regional conflict, most notably in neighboring Kenya, served Al-Shabaab’s narrative 
and strategic plan. 
To accomplish the reemphasis on attacks in Kenya, Al-Shabaab focused on 
establishing specialized planning, increased recruitment, and innovations in the roles of 
women within the group. Narrowing the focus on specific attack planning within Kenya 
required internal reorganization within Al-Shabaab. Bryden and Bahra clarify the nature of 
Al-Shabaab’s reform: “One key dimension of this reform involved delegating to Al-
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Shabaab’s forces along the Kenyan border the responsibility for operations into adjacent 
parts of Kenya.”431 Al-Shabaab’s internal reform allowed dedicated cells within the group 
to plan and conduct strategic attacks on specific regions within Kenya, resulting in highly 
successful operations in the number of casualties and propaganda opportunities.432 
These targeted attacks within Kenya also offered Al-Shabaab the publicity 
necessary to ramp up its recruitment efforts among Kenya’s disaffected ethnic Somalis.433 
Working through the Al-Hijra network, Al-Shabaab actively targeted Kenyan prisons and 
vulnerable youths, including increasing numbers of women and girls, for recruitment into 
the jihadist struggle.434 These Kenyan female recruits often played supportive roles such 
as serving as confidential informants or couriers of IED components, communications 
equipment, and other operational materiel.435 The use of women in supportive roles often 
attracted less attention than their male counterparts while enabling Al-Shabaab’s 
capabilities to expand within Kenya.436 
Ultimately, Al-Shabaab’s successful attack at Garissa University proved a critical 
turning point in reestablishing the group’s credibility and legitimacy among its supporters 
and instilling terror among its enemies.437 The coordination with the Al-Hijra network to 
conduct the attack proved Al-Shabaab’s “identity and its aspirations have transcended the 
movement’s Somali origins, transforming both the theatre and the nature of its ‘jihad’” 
according to Bryden.438 Again, Al-Shabaab’s targeting of Kenya proved vital in their 
rebound and provided further evidence for the accuracy of Hypothesis 2. 
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D. APPLICATION OF HYPOTHESIS 3: FAILED COUNTERTERRORISM 
1. The Federal Government of Somalia’s Policies and Impact 
Since its transition from the TFG and official founding in 2012, the FGS remained 
extremely limited in its capacity to control territory and provide essential services within 
Somalia, especially when faced with Al-Shabaab’s entrenched and committed jihadist 
challenge.439 Within the FGS, internal infighting generated a loss of confidence from both 
members and external supporters and deepened military insecurity, allowing the space for 
Al-Shabaab to exploit, as evidenced by various large-scale raids on vulnerable FGS 
garrisons.440 
In attempting to remedy the dire situation, the FGS, with the support of AMISOM, 
launched two large-scale offensives designed to take back territory from Al-Shabaab, 
Operation Eagle in March 2014, and Operation Indian Ocean in September 2014.441 
Although Operation Eagle succeeded in taking back 10 Somali towns and disrupting Al-
Shabaab resupply routes, reports of systematic abuses damped the victory.442 According 
to Charbonneau, UN reporting indicated evidence of FGS corruption, “The Monitoring 
Group has identified a number of issues and concerns over current management of weapons 
and ammunition stockpiles by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which point to 
high-level and systematic abuses in weapons and ammunition management and 
distribution.”443 With the joint FGS-AMISOM Operation Indian Ocean, the FGS hoped to 
address these shortfalls while significantly striking Al-Shabaab strongholds. 
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Godane’s death coincided with the commencement of Operation Indian Ocean and 
was accompanied by the FGS’s public appeal for Al-Shabaab fighters to cease operations. 
In this push, the FGS and AMISOM attempted to recapture Somali coastal towns from Al-
Shabaab with the hope that the loss of its emir would fragment the group.444 At the same 
time, Somali government officials offered a 45 day amnesty period to Al-Shabaab fighters 
who surrendered, pledging rehabilitation and job skills training to former fighters.445 
Anzalone highlights the promising implications of the FGS’s actions in the wake of 
Godane’s death: “The strengthening of governing structures, significant reduction of 
blatant corruption at high levels of government, allure of the federal government’s 
‘amnesty’ offer to al-Shabab fighters, and reining in independent militias will significantly 
damage al-Shabab’s narrative as well as bolster the confidence of local communities.”446 
Unfortunately, although the FGS’s actions immediately following Godane’s death 
attempted to foster a comprehensive approach to tackling the problem of Al-Shabaab, the 
plans fell short of lasting solutions.  
In the aftermath of Godane’s death, the FGS publicized lofty goals to quell violence 
and foster stability, but deep-set internal problems remained. The government attempted to 
curb illicit financing though anti-money laundering legislation, but often lacked the 
capacity to enforce such laws.447 Al-Shabaab’s attacks against FGS and AMISOM forces 
continued to highlight the government’s deficiencies, including troop shortages and lack 
of territorial control.448 Even within Somali government and security services, Al-Shabaab 
wielded influence, according to Barrett, “The distinction between FGS supporters and Al-
Shabaab supporters is not easily draw. Some politicians, businessmen and clan elders will 
have a foot in both camps, even members of the security forces may spend part of their 
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time with one side and part with the other.”449 Ultimately, the FGS’s rhetoric failed to 
result in the government’s real authority over Somali territory or the required legitimacy 
among the Somali people and instead continued to allow Al-Shabaab’s presence and 
resilience throughout the region as noted in Hypothesis 3. 
2. AMISOM’s Policies and Impact 
In the period prior to Godane’s death, AMISOM significantly intensified operations 
against Al-Shabaab. According to Bryden, “Al-Shabaab is likely to face significantly 
greater military pressure in 2014 than it did in 2013. The decision of the UN Security 
Council to augment AMISOM to over 22,000 troops with an explicit mandate to resume 
offensive operations, and the military means to do so, is already beginning to shape the 
battlefield on the ground. Since late 2013, AMISOM had begun to maneuver more 
aggressively in central Somalia threatening strongholds in Buulobarde and ‘Eel Buur.”450 
AMISOM’s troop increases and reemphasis on offensive missions coincided with the 
previously mentioned joint FGS-AMISOM operations: Operation Eagle and Operation 
Indian Ocean.451 As with the FGS strategy, AMISOM sought to isolate Al-Shabaab 
militants through cutting off supply lines and eliminating the group from village 
strongholds.452 
At the death of Godane, AMISOM continued its push to recapture coastal towns 
and exact further pressure on Al-Shabaab during the vulnerable leadership transition.453 
During the sensitive period in the months following Godane’s death, AMISOM proved 
successful in nominally gaining territory, cutting off some of Al-Shabaab’s funding 
streams, and supporting the FGS in encouraging desertions and defections from the jihadist 
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organization.454 While all of these developments appeared promising at face value, 
AMISOM’s fight against Al-Shabaab proved far from over.455 
The coming months shifted AMISOM’s tentative success against Al-Shabaab to a 
stalemate with little end in sight.456 Al-Shabaab’s military prowess, combined with 
manning challenges among AMISOM member states, stalled the coalition’s progress 
within Somalia.457 Maruf and Joseph note how multiple attacks by Al-Shabaab resulted in 
some withdrawals of AMISOM forces: “Attacks like the one on El Adde have forced 
AMISOM and the SNA to abandon some of their forward bases, allowing al-Shabaab to 
retake areas it lost several years ago. The November 2018 U.N. monitors’ report says the 
group is currently in direct control of territory along the Juba valley in southern 
Somalia.”458  
Along with AMISOM’s military losses, diplomatic discussions of AMISOM’s exit 
strategy commenced.459 According to Kluijver, AMISOM’s exit plan from the Somali 
conflict centered around the training of the Somali National Army: “This task has been 
taken on by a host of actors, from private South African companies paid for by the UAE, 
to U.S. and UK military contractors and a small EU training force; but the largest group of 
trainers comes from Turkey.”460 Although AMISOM chose to remain in Somalia, the 
announcement of potential withdrawal and delegation of training responsibilities to 
external states indicated AMISOM’s waning political will to defeat Al-Shabaab decisively. 
These factors provided Al-Shabaab leadership assurances that they need only to wait out 
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foreign presence and renewed Al-Shabaab’s commitment and capability to rebound—all 
further evidence for the validity of Hypothesis 3.  
3. United States’ Policies and Impact 
The United States involvement in Somalia stayed reasonably consistent in the 
period leading up to Godane’s death, with the main crux of support being training and 
equipment to AMISOM and intelligence sharing aimed at diminishing Al-Shabaab’s 
strength and influence.461 In addition to support for AMISOM, the U.S. maintained strong 
bilateral ties with Kenya, which continued air and naval operations targeting Al-
Shabaab.462 The U.S. direct military involvement remained limited to airstrikes on high-
level Al-Shabaab leadership, as with Godane’s predecessor, Aden Hashi Ayro, who was 
killed in a U.S. airstrike in 2008.463 In support of AMISOM and the FGS’s offensives 
against Al-Shabaab, the U.S. would again resort to such tactics to eliminate Godane and 
further degrade Al-Shabaab’s capabilities. 
In early September 2014, the United States announced the death of Godane via U.S. 
military airstrike as a “major symbolic and operational loss to Al-Shabaab.” 464 By 
decapitating Al-Shabaab’s organization, the U.S. expected it would inflict the greatest 
leadership and unity challenge upon the jihadist group since its founding.465 As many 
analysts predicted Al-Shabaab would suffer power struggles and infighting, the U.S. 
declared it would continue applying pressure to the group through diplomatic, military, 
intelligence, and financial levers.466 
 
461 Edmund Blair and Drazen Jorgic, “Attack on Somali Islamist Leader Seen Triggering Power 
Struggle,” Reuters, September 4, 2014, https://in.reuters.com/article/somalia-usa-islamist-
idINKBN0GZ02R20140904. 
462 Name Redacted, U.S.-Kenya Relations: Current Political and Security Issues, CRS Report No. 
R42967 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015), 11, https://www.everycrsreport.com/
files/20150723_R42967_5dddfa027dbd8d43e3f4b090e7904236fdffe1d7.pdf. 
463 Mesfin, “What Changes for Al-Shabaab after the Death of Godane?” 
464 Kirby, “Statement from Pentagon Press Secretary Rear Admiral John Kirby on Ahmed Godane.” 
465 Blair and Jorgic, “Attack on Somali Islamist Leader Seen Triggering Power Struggle.” 
466 Alexander, “U.S. Confirms Death of al Shabaab Leader Godane in Somalia Strike”; Blair and 
Jorgic, “Attack on Somali Islamist Leader Seen Triggering Power Struggle.” 
85 
However, the aftermath of Godane’s death marked a shift in Al-Shabaab methods 
and strategy, likely as a result of U.S. counterterrorism tactics. First, the United States’ use 
of airstrikes against senior Al-Shabaab leaders including Godane, pushed the group to 
operate move covertly, moving in smaller groups and dispersing its militia to avoid 
detection and catastrophic losses.467 These tactics presented a more complex challenge to 
those conventional forces who sought to oppose the group, including AMISOM and the 
FGS.  
Secondly, immediately after Godane’s death, Al-Shabaab significantly increased 
its suicide attacks and coordinated strikes against civilian and military targets.468 Shire 
explains the phenomenon: “Even though the elimination of militant leaders might affect 
groups’ strategies of target selection and preferences on attack modalities, the decapitation 
of terrorist leaders do not appear to reduce the frequency of these attacks, nor the number 
of fatalities but instead bolsters militant groups’ resolve and strength.”469 Ultimately, the 
U.S. decision to eliminate Godane failed to fragment the group and weaken the 
organization’s solidity, but instead led to a more unified, determined, and resilient force. 
While the U.S. provided financial aid, training, and diplomatic engagement in support of 
Al-Shabaab’s defeat, the limited positive impact to AMISOM and the FGS was 
overshadowed by the policy backfire of killing Godane. This suggests Hypothesis 3 played 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. ASSESSED CRITICAL FACTORS FOR RESILIENCY 
Al-Shabaab overcame near elimination after the failure of the Ramadan Offensive 
in 2010, noted in Case Study 1, and the death of emir Godane in 2014, seen in Case Study 
2. Al-Shabaab’s reliance on its organizational cohesion, financial mechanisms, and 
intelligence apparatus in both case studies validates Hypothesis 1: The Organizational 
Attributes approach. The group’s ability to consolidate leadership and eliminate rivals, 
adapt income sources and reduce expenditures, and maintain a loyal and effective Amniyat 
demonstrates critical factors for the group’s rebound after the Ramadan Offensive. 
Following the death of Godane, further proof of Al-Shabaab’s organizational attributes 
included the efficacy of the executive council in appointing the emir’s successor, the 
flexible organizational funding methods, and the Amiyat’s role in targeting new recruits. 
This flexibility and adaptability contributed to Al-Shabaab’s resiliency. 
Amid its organizational reformation post-Ramadan Offensive and Godane’s death, 
Al-Shabaab analyzed weaknesses in the Somali state government to discover ways to fill 
the void. Al-Shabaab provided goods and services and became a legitimate actor among 
impoverished Somali populations. Kenya’s proximity and viability as a target of 
opportunity also allowed Al-Shabaab to use major external attacks to gain credibility as a 
significant terrorist organization, exemplifying Hypothesis 2: The Political Context 
approach. 
The validity of Hypothesis 3: The Failed Counterterrorism approach 
demonstrates Al-Shabaab’s ability to exploit failures of regional counterterrorist actors for 
its organizational rebound. In both case studies, the inability of the Somali military forces 
to hold and control territory outside of urban areas, the ineffective AMISOM policies and 
potential lack of consistent political will to remain in Somalia, and the United States’ 
reliance on limited indirect support and airstrikes allow the space for Al-Shabaab’s 
resurgence.  
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In both severe low points, Al-Shabaab’s both opportunistic and deeply-entrenched 
movement rebounded through the multifaceted approaches: internal organizational 
attributes, opportunities in the political context, and exploitation of failed counterterrorism 
actions. While all three hypotheses prove relevant in Al-Shabaab’s revival, the strength of 
Al-Shabaab’s organizational attributes within the failed state context were absolutely 
essential for the group’s survival. Without Al-Shabaab’s organizational cohesion, 
intelligence apparatus, and financial institutions filling the void of a capable nation-state 
and gaining the tacit approval of the Somali population, it is unlikely the group would have 
overcome its debilitating blows. In the absence of a legitimate and capable governance 
functions in Somalia, any external counterterrorism efforts, even if militarily successful, 
offer only limited effect on Al-Shabaab’s ultimate success or failure. 
B. SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Looking into the future, any counterterrorism solution should take into account Al-
Shabaab’s critical factors for resiliency and approach a response in a similar multifaceted 
fashion. Somalia, AMISOM, and the United States each hold a vested interest in the defeat 
of this terrorist organization. The policy implications to achieve this objective begin with 
the Somali government’s national level, reinforced by AMISOM’s regional force and the 
United States’ multi-domain support. 
1. The Federal Government of Somalia 
Al-Shabaab’s continued success in Somalia will depend on both its organizational 
strengths of adaptability and innovation, and the void left by Somalia’s federal government 
failings. Petrich explains, “As the primary alternative government in the country, al-
Shabaab is at the heart of any solution to a stable Somalia, and we cannot credibly expect 
progress to be made without hamstringing the group. Some of the more common conflict 
resolution methods will not work in this context: al-Shabaab is uniquely gifted in its ability 
to extort the population while maintaining its narrative of legitimate resistance.”470 
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Decreasing Al-Shabaab’s organizational strengths including their organizational cohesion, 
financial mechanisms, and intelligence apparatus must take a comprehensive approach. 
Al-Shabaab’s power lies in that it is not only a terrorist organization, but also a 
militant and insurgent group which has strong cultural ties with Somalia’s populous, 
according to an interview with Marchal.471 Therefore, any policy must consider this 
cultural dimension and provide a viable alternative for the void Al-Shabaab can fill. For 
Maruf and Joseph, this solution includes a local approach to defeat Al-Shabaab: “At the 
moment the only feasible way to defeat Al-Shabaab is by a grassroots movement that 
completely rejects the organization and its objectives.”472 A common consensus among 
diverse Somali experts is that such a solution should not be based in war, jihad, or external 
manipulation, but instead domestic political development.473   
Al-Shabaab’s ability to operate internal funding mechanisms, including taxation, 
should be addressed through a comprehensive approach that strengthens the government 
of Somalia’s legitimacy. Merely attempting to eliminate Al-Shabaab’s taxation system in 
Somalia will not solve the greater concern that the government of Somalia cannot provide 
for its citizens’ security. It will be necessary to address the deeper issues of Somalia’s 
government failings and find ways to address them. If the structure and function of the 
government of Somalia can improve at both the regional state level and national level, this 
will have a significant impact on delegitimizing Al-Shabaab as a viable political actor in 
the region.474  
In Pape and Karamba’s Vulnerability Assessment within Somalia, the researchers 
identify a targeted area for improvement within the government of Somalia, the federal 
taxation system: “Local governments have the advantage as they are the closest to their 
constituents. None of the households responded that they pay taxes to Al-Shabaab. This 
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may well be the case since Al-Shabaab does not have strongholds in urban areas 
anymore.”475 The researchers go on to note that the citizens of Somalia may be willing to 
pay taxes to any entity that is more likely to enforce collection and that Al-Shabaab’s 
ideological reach is likely superficial or unsolicited.476 This indicates the population of 
Somalia is highly likely to accept the Somali state if it prioritizes enacting and enforcing 
governance functions which incorporate local needs. 
Anzalone defines the areas of improvement which need to be prioritized  within the 
government of Somalia to challenge the Amniyat’s capabilities and Al-Shabaab’s 
monopoly on Somalia’s security: “Political improvements include a sustained campaign 
against corruption, building up reliable security forces loyal to the state instead of specific 
clans/sub-clans, and other related issues such as paying security forces regularly and on 
time as well as being held accountable for donor funds and equipment.”477  By reducing 
corruption and promoting competent security services, the government of Somalia paves 
the way for trustworthy intelligence functions of their own. Such developments are 
possible, as Horton describes neighboring Somaliland’s intelligence apparatus 
prioritization: 
One of the keys to their success are the formal and informal intelligence 
gathering capabilities of Somaliland’s National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
and the army’s and police’s own intelligence officers. Informal intelligence 
gathering networks are extant throughout Somaliland where they are nested 
within local communities. Formal networks led by officers from the NIS, 
army, and police exist alongside and in conjunction with the informal 
networks that act as early detection systems or tripwires.478 
Somalia’s government can likewise prioritize consistent salaries to members of the 
security sector and work to establish trustworthy informant networks in both urban and 
rural areas. Through concerted efforts to reduce the government of Somalia’s rampant 
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corruption, the federal government can focus on improving the federal security and 
intelligence services to counter Al-Shabaab’s mafia-like hold on Somali populations.  
As the International Crisis Group reports: “For many Somalis, Al-Shabaab is only 
one, and not necessarily the most pressing, of the many problems they face; and for some 
communities and individuals, it offers practical solutions and benefits, including mediating 
local clan disputes, improving religious education, providing basic services and 
institutionalising consultative bodies for local governance arrangements.” 479 Identifying 
and responding to the true needs of the Somali population would allow FGS to build trust 
in legitimate government institutions and diminish the influence and power of Al-Shabaab 
as a viable political alternative. 
2. AMISOM 
One of Al-Shabaab’s strengths remains its continued ability to hold territory and 
remain profitable while undermining the Somali government.480 In order to support the 
Somali government’s ability to combat this threat, policy solutions must include a military 
component, specifically the support and backing of AMISOM. In a 2019 meeting with the 
UN Security Council, Somalia’s representative emphasized the need for ongoing support 
to Somalia’s military and security forces, especially by way of maintaining AMISOM’s 
mandate.481 
Although the multinational force has made the counterterrorism fight against Al-
Shabaab a priority, Anzalone points out, “Some AMISOM countries such as Kenya and 
Ethiopia have their own interests in Somalia and, though they are a part of the African 
Union force, have also pursued these interests. The international community should hold 
the Somali government accountable so that the process of rebuilding the country does not 
become a business in and of itself for corrupt politicians and other officials.”482 Also, 
 
479 International Crisis Group, “Somalia,” 20. 
480 Hansen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 141. 
481 United Nations Security Council, “Somalia’s 2020 Elections Will Be Historic Milestone on Long 
Journey Back to Security, Stability, Special Representative Tells Security Council,” Meetings Coverage 
and Press Releases, February 24, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14120.doc.htm. 
482 Anzalone, “Al-Shabaab.” 
92 
AMISOM’s previous announcements of military withdrawal and minimized support 
efforts severely hamper defeat-Al-Shabaab efforts. Any indication of waning political will 
emboldens Al-Shabaab militants to continue their protracted war and simply wait out 
foreign presence. It is in both the United States and the international communities’ interest 
to support a strong and stable Somalia, and providing a united response to the country’s 
most significant destabilizing factor, Al-Shabaab, will ensure effective solutions last well 
into the future. 
3. The United States 
Currently, according to Ploch Blanchard, “The United States has provided over 
$487 million in humanitarian assistance to Somalia in FY2018 - FY2019. Non-emergency 
U.S. foreign aid, including funding for AMISOM, totaled almost $430 million in 
FY2018.”483 Former United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Combatant 
Commander General Waldhauser emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to 
confronting Al-Shabaab: “United States military training and operations alone cannot 
defeat al-Shabaab… alongside United States diplomatic and development efforts, they 
provide legitimacy to the Federal Government of Somalia and create opportunity for 
political and economic growth, and security and stability in the broader region.”484 Al-
Shabaab is unlikely to be weakened without a strong, capable state alternative to provide 
the much needed stability for Somalia’s populous and international support for this 
process.485 
Understanding Al-Shabaab’s nuanced approach to staying in power is critical for 
future policy implications aimed at diminishing the threat. The U.S. approach of targeted 
killings of Al-Shabaab leadership has thus far been ineffective at diminishing Al-Shabaab’s 
ability to conduct attacks.486 As Maruf and Joseph note, “Even if more missiles find their 
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target, Al-Shabaab seems more than capable of taking the hits. While there’s no doubt some 
of its fighters joined for non-religious reasons—forced recruitment, money—the group 
also has a backbone of die-hard jihadists who have kept fighting despite years of setbacks. 
Al-Shabaab can fill leadership roles as needed.”487 With this in mind, potential policy 
solutions must go beyond U.S. kinetic operations and instead support the Somali 
government’s ability to provide security on the ground and stability for their population 
By looking at the Al-Shabaab terrorist network as more than purely a military 
threat, but instead as a political, economic, and governance issue within Somalia, the 
government of Somalia can attack the root causes of terrorism rather than perpetuate an 
endless conflict. This thesis demonstrates a multifaceted counterterrorism approach must 
address Al-Shabaab’s specific organizational attributes, the local political context, and past 
policy missteps. In this manner, the United States and the international community can 
support the federal government of Somalia to prioritize a comprehensive strategy to 
implement viable and lasting solutions to Somalia’s security issues, most importantly the 
pervasiveness of Al-Shabaab’s terrorist network. 
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